Intelligence Estimate: Impact of Assad’s Abdication and HTS Ascendancy on the Antiochian Orthodox Patriarchate in Syria

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front):

The abdication of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) present significant threats to Syria’s stability, minority populations, and U.S. interests in the region. The Orthodox Christian community faces immediate risks, including targeted violence, destruction of religious and cultural sites, forced displacement, and restrictions on religious practices under HTS’s Islamist governance.

Key threats include:

1. Regional Instability: Competing actions by Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Kurdish factions increase the potential for broader conflict.
2. Extremist Entrenchment: HTS consolidation risks creating a durable hub for extremist networks.
3. Humanitarian Crises: Refugee flows and civilian suffering threaten to overwhelm U.S. allies like Jordan and Turkey.

Given the complexity of the situation, the U.S. must pursue a strategic, multi-faceted approach to:

• Stabilize the region through enhanced intelligence, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and calibrated diplomatic engagement.
• Prevent extremist entrenchment by supporting moderate governance models and leveraging regional partnerships.
• Mitigate humanitarian crises by bolstering support to regional allies and international agencies.
• Balance competing interests among key actors like Israel, Turkey, and Iran to preserve long-term stability.

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Executive Summary:

The collapse of the Assad regime has created a power vacuum, rapidly filled by HTS in northern and central Syria. This group’s governance poses both immediate and long-term challenges to U.S. objectives. Regional actors, including Israel and Turkey, have exploited the shifting dynamics to secure their interests, but their cooperation appears tenuous, especially as Israeli leaders grow wary of Turkey’s broader ambitions.

Stability in Syria aligns with U.S. goals of countering extremism, ensuring the security of regional allies, and preventing broader destabilization. A direct military approach is not in U.S. interests, given the risks of entanglement and escalation. Instead, a strategic framework emphasizing intelligence, ISR, diplomatic engagement, and conflict de-escalation is essential to managing the crisis.

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Strategic Assessment and Regional Dynamics

Power Vacuum and Extremist Consolidation:

The power vacuum left by Assad’s abdication has allowed HTS to consolidate control. While HTS claims to pursue moderate governance, its historical ties to al-Qaeda and patterns of behavior signal risks for extremist entrenchment.

• U.S. Interest: Prevent Syria from becoming a secure base for transnational extremist operations.
• Actionable Steps: Deploy ISR assets to monitor HTS governance, financial networks, and external connections to regional or global jihadist organizations.

Regional Actors and Strategic Complications:

1. Turkey:
   Turkey’s focus on neutralizing Kurdish forces in northern Syria aligns with its domestic priorities but complicates broader stabilization efforts. Its collaboration with HTS raises questions about Turkey’s long-term objectives and its potential to escalate tensions with Israel.
   • U.S. Response: Balance Turkish security interests with the need to limit HTS’s power. Use diplomatic channels to ensure Turkish actions do not undermine broader counterterrorism goals.
2. Israel:
   Israel’s recent strikes in southern Syria aim to weaken Iranian influence and prevent arms transfers to Hezbollah. However, Israel’s growing mistrust of Turkish ambitions could disrupt any cooperative dynamics between these two regional powers.
   • U.S. Response: Support Israeli counter-Iranian operations while encouraging restraint to avoid destabilizing northern Syria further.
3. Iran and Proxies:
   Iran seeks to preserve its influence in Syria through its proxy network, even as its position has weakened following Assad’s departure.
   • U.S. Response: Maintain economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran while monitoring proxy activities near U.S. allies like Israel and Jordan.
4. Kurdish Factions:
   The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remain a key player in northeastern Syria but face growing pressure from Turkey and HTS.
   • U.S. Response: Provide material and intelligence support to Kurdish factions to maintain their capacity to resist both HTS and Turkish aggression.

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Humanitarian Concerns and Cultural Preservation

Humanitarian Crisis:

The rise of HTS and escalating conflicts have driven mass displacement, with minority populations, including Orthodox Christians, at heightened risk. Refugees are increasingly straining neighboring countries’ resources.

• U.S. Interest: Prevent humanitarian crises from destabilizing allies like Jordan and Turkey.
• Actionable Steps: Increase funding and logistical support for refugee assistance programs. Establish humanitarian corridors in coordination with regional actors.

Cultural Heritage:

The destruction or repurposing of historic religious sites under HTS governance threatens global cultural heritage and erodes Syria’s multi-religious identity.

• U.S. Interest: Protect cultural heritage to prevent long-term societal fragmentation.
• Actionable Steps: Partner with UNESCO and international organizations to document and protect vulnerable sites. Use targeted sanctions to deter HTS-linked individuals from destroying cultural assets.

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Strategic Recommendations

Intelligence and ISR Enhancement

• Objective: Build a comprehensive understanding of HTS governance, regional dynamics, and extremist networks.
• Actions:
  • Expand ISR operations in northern Syria to monitor HTS-controlled areas and cross-border movements.
  • Establish intelligence-sharing mechanisms with regional allies like Israel, Jordan, and Turkey.

Diplomatic Engagement

• Objective: Leverage U.S. influence to balance competing interests and reduce conflict escalation.
• Actions:
  • Convene a regional summit involving Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and Kurdish representatives to negotiate deconfliction agreements and minority protections.
  • Engage with moderate Syrian factions to promote governance models that challenge HTS’s legitimacy.

Humanitarian and Stabilization Efforts

• Objective: Mitigate the humanitarian crisis to reduce destabilization risks.
• Actions:
  • Increase U.S. financial contributions to international aid agencies operating in Syria.
  • Coordinate with regional partners to manage refugee flows and improve living conditions in host countries.

Counter-Extremism Initiatives

• Objective: Prevent HTS from solidifying its control and serving as a transnational extremist hub.
• Actions:
  • Use economic and financial sanctions to disrupt HTS funding networks.
  • Deploy information campaigns to expose HTS’s extremist agenda and discredit its governance claims.

Given the complex dynamics in Syria and its regional implications, the U.S. must navigate a delicate balance to mitigate risks of destabilization, protect its interests, and prevent blowback that could strain allied or semi-aligned governments like Egypt, Jordan, and others. Peripheral issues in Cyprus, Libya, and the broader regional power plays involving Turkey, Russia, and Iran add layers of complexity to U.S. strategic calculations.

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COA 1: Regional Stabilization through Humanitarian Corridors

Objective: Prevent regional destabilization by managing refugee flows and mitigating the humanitarian crisis.
Actions:

• Collaborate with international organizations to establish and secure humanitarian corridors for civilians fleeing HTS-controlled areas.
• Negotiate temporary asylum agreements with neighboring countries like Jordan and Turkey to manage refugee inflows.
• Provide logistical and financial support to regional partners and NGOs for transportation, resettlement, and long-term aid.
• Engage Egypt in humanitarian discussions to ensure its stability and participation in regional burden-sharing.

Risks:

• Evacuation routes may be targeted by extremist factions or rival groups.
• Neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Turkey, may resist additional refugee intake due to political and economic strain.
• Blowback risks if local populations in host countries view U.S.-backed resettlement efforts as imposing undue burdens on their governments.

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COA 2: Support for Localized Security Initiatives

Objective: Enable regional stability by strengthening local security capabilities against extremist threats.
Actions:

• Identify and support moderate factions and community leaders willing to defend against HTS aggression.
• Provide non-lethal assistance such as communications equipment, training, and ISR intelligence to local defense groups.
• Facilitate mutual defense arrangements between aligned factions, including Kurdish forces, tribal coalitions, and potentially Druze and Christian communities.
• Build redundant ISR and monitoring networks in Cyprus, leveraging U.S. naval assets to monitor cross-border flows and maritime traffic linked to Turkish and Russian activities.

Risks:

• Escalation risks as HTS or other dominant factions target U.S.-supported groups.
• Potential misuse of U.S. support if factions prioritize local rivalries over broader stabilization.
• Increased tensions with Turkey if Kurdish support is perceived as undermining its strategic interests.

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COA 3: Strategic Diplomatic Engagement

Objective: Use diplomatic channels to shape HTS’s behavior and balance competing regional interests.
Actions:

• Engage in backchannel discussions with HTS leadership through intermediaries to secure limited non-aggression commitments.
• Leverage Turkey’s influence over HTS to contain extremist policies and mitigate spillover effects on Kurdish factions.
• Build regional coalitions involving Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to coordinate deconfliction and regional stability strategies.
• Ensure Cyprus-Israel cooperation aligns with U.S. interests, addressing tensions between Turkey and Cyprus that could spill into broader conflict.
• Use Libya as a case study to warn regional actors of risks tied to infrastructure collapse and proxy escalations, highlighting the interconnectedness of their engagements.

Risks:

• Diplomatic overtures to HTS risk being perceived as legitimizing an extremist group.
• Regional actors’ competing interests (e.g., Turkish ambitions in Libya versus Cypriot concerns) may hinder coordination.
• Strain on relationships with Egypt and Jordan if public opinion shifts against U.S.-aligned diplomatic efforts perceived as favoring one regional faction over others.

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COA 4: Indirect International Security Interventions

Objective: Contain extremist expansion and stabilize HTS-controlled areas without direct U.S. military involvement.
Actions:

• Advocate for an international peacekeeping mission under the United Nations or regional organizations to safeguard civilians and stabilize conflict zones.
• Support infrastructure protection efforts, particularly in Libya and HTS-controlled areas reliant on Russian-built energy plants.
• Deploy technical and financial resources to ensure peacekeeping forces are capable of ISR integration, reducing risks of extremist expansion.
• Establish protected zones for civilians near Syria’s borders to reduce refugee flows into host countries, working with Jordan and Turkey to ensure effectiveness.

Risks:

• Difficulty in achieving international consensus due to geopolitical rivalries and competing priorities, particularly among Russia, Turkey, and the EU.
• Resistance from HTS or other factions, leading to conflict escalation and undermining peacekeeping efforts.
• Blowback risks in Libya and Cyprus if U.S. initiatives appear to favor one regional actor’s ambitions over another’s (e.g., Turkey vs. EU-backed Cypriot interests).

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Peripheral Considerations: Cyprus, Libya, and Regional Strains

1. Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean Dynamics:
   • Turkey-Cyprus Tensions: Turkish provocations in Cyprus, including maritime claims and potential military maneuvers, threaten broader Mediterranean stability.
   • Israel-Cyprus Alignment: U.S. support for Israel-Cyprus cooperation can strengthen infrastructure security, but risks alienating Turkey.
2. Syria’s Energy and Governance Fragility

1. Russian-Controlled Infrastructure in Syria:
   • The majority of Syria’s critical infrastructure, including energy facilities, was constructed and maintained with Russian expertise. Russia’s strategic shift of naval and military resources from Syria to Libya could leave these systems vulnerable to neglect or sabotage, exacerbating the country’s fragility.
   • Any degradation in Syria’s infrastructure could lead to widespread humanitarian crises, reduced energy availability, and an inability to sustain governance or economic recovery, further destabilizing the region.
2. Libya as a Russian Naval and Strategic Fallback:
   • Russia’s relocation of naval assets from Syria to Libya signals a reallocation of resources, reflecting shifts in its strategic priorities. This move potentially leaves Syria with less direct Russian military and logistical support while creating opportunities for competing actors to assert influence.
   • Libya, previously a key ratline for arms to Syrian factions, remains interconnected with the Syrian conflict. Increased Russian focus on Libya may stretch its capacity to maintain influence in Syria, creating openings for both the U.S. and other regional powers to shape the evolving power dynamics.
3. Turkey’s Dual-Front Commitments in Syria and Libya:
   • Turkey’s active role in Libya as a counterbalance to Russian influence adds strain to its already significant commitments in northern Syria. This dual-front engagement presents diplomatic opportunities for the U.S. to pressure Turkey into de-escalating tensions in Syria in exchange for reduced opposition in Libya.
   • The Turkish-Libyan connection further complicates U.S. efforts in Syria, as Ankara seeks to leverage its influence in both theaters to strengthen its geopolitical position.

3. Egypt and Jordan’s Internal Balances:
   • Populace vs. Leadership Alignment: Public opinion in Egypt and Jordan may oppose U.S. actions viewed as supporting Western-aligned regional policies, straining leadership’s ability to cooperate.
   • Infrastructure and Refugee Management: Both nations face significant infrastructure and economic strain, exacerbated by refugee flows.

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Comprehensive Analysis and Recommendations

A successful U.S. strategy must integrate the following elements:

1. Stabilizing Syria’s Periphery: Ensure that Cyprus, Libya, and Egypt remain insulated from Syria’s destabilizing effects by reinforcing regional alliances and infrastructure protections.
2. Balancing Regional Powers: Actively mediate between Turkey, Israel, and other actors to prevent escalations that could derail broader stability efforts.
3. Long-Term Regional Stability: Leverage humanitarian corridors, localized security, and multilateral diplomacy to address the Syrian crisis while mitigating risks of spillover into allied or semi-aligned nations.
4. Countering Blowback: Maintain awareness of domestic pressures in Egypt and Jordan, ensuring U.S. actions do not inadvertently destabilize these key partners.

A hybrid approach integrating elements of all COAs is recommended, emphasizing:

• Diplomacy with regional actors to reduce tensions.
• Humanitarian leadership to manage crises effectively.
• Strategic ISR and security investments to contain extremist threats without overextending U.S. commitments.

This balanced approach minimizes risks of blowback while protecting U.S. strategic interests and ensuring stability in an increasingly fragile region.

Recommendations for U.S. Strategy in Syria

To address Syria’s infrastructure vulnerabilities and the broader regional connections:

1. Leverage Russia’s Strategic Realignment:
   • Capitalize on Russia’s naval asset relocation to Libya by strengthening regional partnerships in Syria, particularly with moderate factions and international actors like Jordan and the Gulf states.
   • Highlight infrastructure fragility as a justification for increased U.S. and international humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Syria to preempt further Russian or Turkish exploitation.
2. Use Libya as a Diplomatic Lever:
   • Engage Turkey in dialogue linking its actions in Libya with de-escalation in Syria, framing cooperation as a means to alleviate its resource and military strains.
   • Monitor Russian activities in Libya to assess their impact on Syria, using this intelligence to anticipate shifts in Russian support for Syrian factions.
3. Protect and Stabilize Syrian Infrastructure:
   • Support initiatives to maintain or repair critical infrastructure in Syria through international organizations, ensuring that local governance structures have the tools necessary to sustain stability.
   • Strengthen ISR capabilities to monitor and secure vital infrastructure, including energy and water resources, to prevent sabotage or extremist exploitation.

By integrating these considerations into broader U.S. policy, the focus remains on stabilizing Syria while mitigating the ripple effects of interconnected conflicts in Libya and the region. This approach minimizes risks of further destabilization and ensures U.S. influence is strategically applied where it matters most.

Appendix: Recent Significant Activities (SIGACTs) in Syria

The following is a summary of significant activities in Syria from December 1 2024 to January 24, 2025, has been marked by significant developments in Syria, encompassing political transitions, security challenges, economic struggles, and evolving regional dynamics.

December 1, 2024

• Capture of Tell Rifaat: Pro-Turkish rebel forces seized the city of Tell Rifaat from Kurdish forces, marking a strategic gain in northern Syria.

December 3, 2024

• UNESCO Recognition: Aleppo soap was recognized by UNESCO as an Intangible Cultural Heritage, underscoring Syria’s rich cultural traditions amid ongoing conflict.

December 5, 2024

• Fall of Hama: Rebel forces captured the strategic city of Hama, delivering a significant blow to government control in central Syria.

December 6, 2024

• Seizure of Deir ez-Zor: Kurdish-led forces took control of Deir ez-Zor, further eroding the Syrian government’s territorial holdings.

December 7, 2024

• Advances in Deraa and Sweida: Rebel forces swiftly captured the cities of Deraa and Sweida, advancing into the suburbs of Damascus and signaling the regime’s weakening grip.

December 8, 2024

• Capture of Homs and Damascus: Rebel forces took control of Homs and the capital, Damascus, leading to President Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country and seeking asylum in Russia.

• Israeli Military Action: Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel seized control of a buffer zone in the Golan Heights, citing security concerns amid the power vacuum.

December 9, 2024

• Manbij Under Rebel Control: Pro-Turkish rebel forces captured the town of Manbij from the Syrian Democratic Forces, consolidating their presence in northern Syria.

December 10, 2024

• International Reactions to Israeli Actions: Middle Eastern nations condemned Israel’s seizure of the buffer zone separating the occupied Golan Heights from the rest of Syria, expressing concerns over territorial integrity and regional stability.
  CNN

December 11–20, 2024

• Formation of Transitional Government: Following the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad, opposition forces established a transitional government led by Mohammed al-Bashir, aiming to stabilize the nation and provide essential services.
  Wikipedia
• International Engagement: Top U.S. officials visited Damascus to meet with the new Syrian leadership, signaling a potential shift in diplomatic relations and support for the transitional government’s efforts.
  Wikipedia

December 21–31, 2024

• Security Incidents: The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported extensive human rights violations throughout December, with 503 civilian deaths, including 96 children and 49 women, highlighting the ongoing security challenges despite the political transition.
  levant24
• Israeli Airstrikes: On December 29, an Israeli airstrike near Damascus reportedly killed 11 people, mostly civilians, underscoring the volatile security situation and regional tensions.

January 2025

• Economic Challenges: Despite the political transition, Syria’s economic hardships persist. The prolonged conflict, corruption, sanctions, and mismanagement have left 90% of the population in poverty, complicating reconstruction efforts.
  Associated Press
• Resumption of International Flights: On January 7, international flights resumed at Damascus airport, indicating a tentative step toward normalization and rebuilding international connections.
• Regional Diplomacy: On January 24, Turkey and Syria agreed to reevaluate customs tariffs on specific products and initiated negotiations to reinstate the free trade agreement suspended since 2011, signaling a potential thaw in relations.
  Reuters
• Security Sector Reforms: Syria’s new authorities are restructuring their police force based on Islamic principles, aiming to replace the dismantled security forces of the former regime. This move reflects the broader influence of Islamic governance in the new administration’s policies. 

These events reflect the rapidly changing dynamics in Syria, with various factions seizing territory and regional actors adjusting their strategies in response to the evolving situation.

Appendix: Threat Impact Matrix

Threat	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level	Description
Expansion of Extremist Networks	High	Severe	Critical	HTS’s consolidation of power in Syria risks creating a safe haven for extremist groups, undermining U.S. counterterrorism efforts and regional security.
Targeted Violence Against U.S. Allies	High	Severe	Critical	Increased violence against U.S.-aligned minority groups (e.g., Christians, Kurds) destabilizes key partnerships and erodes trust in U.S. commitments.
Destruction of Cultural and Religious Sites	High	High	High	Extremist control raises the likelihood of destruction or repurposing of historic and religious sites, diminishing cultural heritage and international prestige.
Displacement and Refugee Crises	High	Severe	Critical	Forced displacement exacerbates refugee flows into neighboring allies like Jordan and Turkey, straining regional stability and humanitarian resources.
Human Rights Violations	High	High	High	HTS’s governance may include arbitrary detention, forced conversions, and other abuses, sparking international condemnation and complicating U.S. diplomacy.
Regional Military Actions	Medium	High	High	Israeli and Turkish interventions risk collateral damage and escalation, potentially destabilizing the region and complicating U.S. deconfliction efforts.
Economic Hardship	High	Medium	High	Economic instability in Syria fuels extremist recruitment and hampers reconstruction, increasing long-term security and humanitarian risks.
Proxy Escalation and Blowback	Medium	High	High	Iranian-backed militias, Turkish operations, and Russian realignments risk creating unintended blowback against U.S. allies and interests in the region.
Infrastructure Collapse	Medium	Severe	High	Russian energy infrastructure in Syria is at risk of neglect or sabotage, leading to potential blackouts and disruptions that worsen the humanitarian crisis.
Kurdish-Turkish Conflicts	High	Severe	Critical	Clashes between Kurdish forces and Turkey increase the risk of U.S.-aligned Kurdish groups being weakened, disrupting U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Inter-Communal Tensions	Medium	Medium	Medium	The power vacuum exacerbates sectarian and ethnic conflicts, increasing local violence and undermining stabilization efforts.
Loss of Educational Opportunities	Medium	Medium	Medium	Conflict and displacement disrupt education systems, impeding the development of civil society and future leaders in Syria, with long-term destabilizing effects.
International Diplomatic Fractures	Low	Medium	Low	Disagreements among U.S. allies and partners over Syria policy may hinder coordinated efforts to stabilize the region and counter extremism.

Key Observations for U.S. Interests:

1. Counterterrorism Priority: HTS’s rise presents a significant threat to U.S. counterterrorism objectives, with the potential for Syria to become a sanctuary for extremist networks.
2. Regional Ally Stability: Refugee flows and proxy conflicts threaten to destabilize key U.S. partners like Jordan, Turkey, and Israel.
3. Strategic Opportunities: Diplomatic engagement and humanitarian efforts provide avenues to reinforce U.S. influence and maintain leverage in the region.
4. Mitigation of Blowback: U.S. actions must carefully balance support for allies and factions without provoking long-term instability or unintended consequences.

This matrix provides a framework for prioritizing U.S. policy responses while mitigating risks to national and regional interests.

Appendix: Key Players

In the aftermath of President Bashar al-Assad’s abdication on December 8, 2024, Syria’s political and military landscape has been reshaped by several key figures and factions.

Primary actors currently influencing the situation:

1. Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (Ahmed al-Sharaa)

Position:

Leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

Background:

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, whose birth name is Ahmed al-Sharaa, is the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant Islamist rebel group in northwestern Syria. Al-Jolani’s leadership has been pivotal in HTS’s transformation from a local al-Qaeda affiliate to a more regionally-focused organization with aspirations of governance.

Early Life and Radicalization:

• Born in 1982 in Daraa, Syria, al-Jolani studied in Damascus before joining the insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq in the mid-2000s.
• He became affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and later served as a key figure within the group’s Syrian wing, which eventually evolved into Jabhat al-Nusra.

Formation of Jabhat al-Nusra:

• In 2012, al-Jolani returned to Syria during the civil war and established Jabhat al-Nusra as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. The group quickly gained notoriety for its battlefield successes against Assad’s forces and its strict Islamist governance in areas under its control.
• Disputes with the Islamic State (ISIS) led al-Jolani to sever ties with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013, marking Jabhat al-Nusra’s divergence from ISIS.

Rebranding as HTS:

• In 2017, al-Jolani announced the formation of HTS, merging Jabhat al-Nusra with several other Islamist factions. HTS officially claimed to sever ties with al-Qaeda, a move widely seen as an effort to improve the group’s international image and attract broader support from the Syrian opposition.

Role in the Fall of Assad:

Under al-Jolani’s leadership, HTS played a critical role in the offensives that led to the collapse of key Syrian government strongholds, including Aleppo and Damascus, in late 2024. These victories were enabled by HTS’s ability to:

• Consolidate alliances with other Islamist factions while neutralizing rival groups.
• Capitalize on the weakening of the Assad regime due to prolonged conflict, economic decline, and reduced international support.
• Navigate complex relationships with Turkey, which provided indirect support to HTS through its broader backing of Syrian opposition forces.

Governance and Rebranding Efforts:

Al-Jolani has attempted to rebrand HTS as a more moderate and pragmatic Islamist organization, distancing it from its al-Qaeda roots and positioning it as a legitimate governing authority in northwestern Syria.

• Governance Approach: HTS has established civil administration structures, including courts and local councils, under the “Syrian Salvation Government” in Idlib. These efforts are aimed at portraying HTS as a stable and capable alternative to the Assad regime.
• Public Messaging: Al-Jolani has made high-profile public appearances, emphasizing HTS’s commitment to protecting religious and ethnic minorities and providing basic services to civilians. However, these claims are often contradicted by reports of human rights abuses and strict enforcement of Islamic law.

Connections and Regional Influence:

Al-Jolani’s leadership places him at the center of HTS’s operations, coordinating with various Islamist factions and navigating complex relationships with other rebel groups and international actors:

• Turkey: HTS has maintained a tacit understanding with Turkey, which uses the group as a buffer against Kurdish forces and other threats near its border. However, Turkey has refrained from officially recognizing or endorsing HTS due to its terrorist designation by the U.S. and other nations.
• Local Factions: HTS has periodically clashed with rival rebel groups, including Turkish-backed factions, but also collaborates with them against common enemies, such as Assad’s forces or ISIS remnants.
• International Perception: Al-Jolani’s attempts to gain legitimacy have met with limited success internationally. The U.S. and other Western nations continue to classify HTS as a terrorist organization due to its extremist ideology and history of violence.

Current Challenges and Strategy:

1. Governance and Legitimacy: HTS struggles to balance its Islamist ideology with the practicalities of governing a diverse population in Idlib, where many civilians resent its authoritarian practices.
2. Regional Pressures: Turkey’s evolving strategy in Syria, combined with increased Israeli and Kurdish activity, poses challenges to HTS’s control of northwestern Syria.
3. Counterterrorism Efforts: HTS remains a target of U.S. and international counterterrorism operations, including drone strikes and sanctions aimed at its leadership and financial networks.

Implications for U.S. Interests:

Al-Jolani’s leadership of HTS underscores the complexity of Syria’s post-Assad landscape:

• Counterterrorism Concerns: HTS’s continued control of territory in Idlib risks turning northwestern Syria into a safe haven for extremist activities, undermining U.S. efforts to combat global terrorism.
• Regional Stability: HTS’s influence exacerbates tensions between Turkey, Kurdish factions, and other actors, complicating U.S. efforts to stabilize Syria and the broader region.
• Humanitarian Impact: While al-Jolani’s governance has provided some semblance of order in Idlib, reports of human rights abuses and forced displacement highlight the ongoing humanitarian crisis under HTS rule.

2. Mohammed al-Bashir

Position:

Appointed Prime Minister of the Syrian Transitional Government

Background:

Mohammed al-Bashir emerged as a consensus candidate for leadership in Syria’s transitional government following the abdication of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Al-Bashir, a prominent figure with a background in political mediation and civil governance, was selected for his perceived ability to navigate Syria’s highly fragmented political landscape. His appointment is widely regarded as an attempt to unify the country’s disparate factions under a central governing authority, while also reassuring the international community of Syria’s commitment to stability and reconstruction.

Early Life and Career:

• Born in Hama, Syria, in the early 1970s, al-Bashir was educated in political science and public administration, earning degrees from universities in Damascus and Europe.
• Before the civil war, he held various administrative roles within Syria’s government, focusing on municipal governance and infrastructure development, gaining a reputation as a pragmatic technocrat.
• During the war, al-Bashir distanced himself from the Assad regime, working with local councils and opposition groups to deliver aid and maintain basic governance in areas outside regime control.

Appointment as Prime Minister:

Al-Bashir’s appointment in December 2024 followed weeks of intense negotiations among opposition groups, regional stakeholders, and international mediators. His selection reflects a delicate balance between Syria’s diverse political and ethnic factions, as well as the competing interests of external powers involved in the conflict.

Key Factors Behind His Appointment:

1. Neutral Standing: Al-Bashir is viewed as a moderate figure without deep ties to any single faction, making him a palatable choice for a wide range of stakeholders.
2. Reputation for Collaboration: His work with local councils during the war demonstrated his ability to navigate complex political environments and foster cooperation among divided communities.
3. International Support: Al-Bashir’s technocratic background and moderate stance have garnered cautious support from the U.S., European Union, and some Arab states, who view his leadership as a stabilizing factor in the transitional period.

Role in the Transitional Government:

As Prime Minister, al-Bashir is tasked with steering Syria through one of the most challenging periods in its modern history. His responsibilities include:

1. Establishing Credible Institutions: Building functional state institutions capable of providing basic services and maintaining law and order in a fractured country.
2. Engaging Diverse Factions: Managing relations with powerful groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), Kurdish forces, and tribal coalitions.
3. Facilitating Reconstruction: Coordinating international aid and investment to rebuild Syria’s devastated infrastructure and economy.
4. Promoting Reconciliation: Addressing grievances among Syria’s various ethnic and sectarian communities to reduce tensions and prevent renewed violence.

Connections and Regional Dynamics:

Al-Bashir’s position places him at the intersection of Syria’s internal power struggles and the competing agendas of regional and international actors:

1. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS):
   • HTS remains a dominant force in northwestern Syria, and al-Bashir has engaged with its leadership to negotiate ceasefires and ensure humanitarian access.
   • His interactions with HTS are fraught with tension, as the group’s Islamist ideology and militant history pose challenges to his efforts to establish a secular and inclusive government.
2. Syrian National Army (SNA):
   • The SNA, backed by Turkey, represents a significant power base in northern Syria. Al-Bashir’s coordination with the SNA has focused on integrating its factions into the transitional government and aligning its military objectives with broader national goals.
3. Kurdish Forces:
   • Al-Bashir has sought to build bridges with Kurdish groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to address their demands for autonomy while preserving Syria’s territorial integrity.
   • His efforts are complicated by Turkish opposition to Kurdish self-rule and ongoing clashes between Kurdish and Turkish-backed forces.
4. Regional Stakeholders:
   • Turkey: Ankara has cautiously supported al-Bashir’s government but continues to prioritize its interests in countering Kurdish influence and securing its border.
   • Israel: Al-Bashir has engaged indirectly with Israel through international mediators, aiming to manage tensions in southern Syria and prevent escalation in the Golan Heights.
   • Iran and Russia: While these former Assad allies have reduced their direct involvement, their influence lingers, particularly in the form of proxy forces and economic stakes.
5. International Actors:
   • United States: Washington has expressed tentative support for al-Bashir’s leadership, viewing his government as a potential partner in stabilizing Syria and countering extremist threats.
   • European Union: The EU has pledged financial and technical assistance for reconstruction efforts, contingent on al-Bashir’s ability to implement governance reforms and protect minority rights.
   • United Nations: The UN is working closely with al-Bashir’s government to coordinate humanitarian aid and facilitate political reconciliation.

Challenges Facing His Leadership:

1. Fragmented Authority: Al-Bashir’s government lacks full control over Syria’s territory, with significant areas dominated by HTS, Kurdish forces, and other factions.
2. Economic Collapse: Rebuilding Syria’s economy requires massive international investment, but corruption, sanctions, and ongoing instability hinder progress.
3. Human Rights Concerns: Reports of abuses by various factions undermine al-Bashir’s efforts to present the transitional government as a legitimate and accountable authority.
4. Regional Tensions: Balancing the interests of Turkey, Israel, Iran, and other regional powers is a delicate and ongoing challenge.

Implications for U.S. Interests:

Mohammed al-Bashir’s leadership presents both opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in Syria:

• Opportunities:
  • Partnering with a moderate and pragmatic leader to stabilize Syria and counter extremist threats.
  • Leveraging al-Bashir’s government to coordinate humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts.
  • Using his leadership to facilitate regional deconfliction and reduce refugee flows into neighboring countries.
• Risks:
  • Al-Bashir’s limited authority and reliance on fragile alliances may undermine his effectiveness.
  • Engagement with factions like HTS could complicate U.S. counterterrorism objectives.
  • Continued instability and external interference risk derailing the transitional government and prolonging the conflict.

3. Hassan Abdul-Ghani

Position:

Syrian Rebel Commander

Background:

Hassan Abdul-Ghani is a prominent commander within the Syrian rebel forces, recognized for his leadership and strategic acumen in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Emerging from the early phases of the civil war, Abdul-Ghani rose through the ranks of opposition factions due to his ability to coordinate large-scale military operations and foster alliances among fragmented rebel groups. He played a pivotal role in the recent offensives that led to the fall of key regime strongholds, including Homs and Damascus, cementing his reputation as a capable and influential leader in Syria’s transitional conflict.

Early Career and Rise to Prominence:

• Abdul-Ghani, a former officer in the Syrian Arab Army, defected early in the conflict, citing disillusionment with the Assad regime’s corruption and authoritarianism.
• After defecting, he aligned with opposition forces, initially joining the Free Syrian Army (FSA) before establishing his own faction within the broader rebel coalition.
• Known for his pragmatic approach, Abdul-Ghani has focused on unifying opposition factions, prioritizing operational coordination over ideological divisions.

Role in the Syrian Conflict:

As a key figure in the rebel military hierarchy, Abdul-Ghani has been instrumental in coordinating offensives against Assad loyalists and consolidating rebel gains in strategically significant areas. His leadership has been marked by a balance of tactical innovation and political negotiation.

1. Recent Achievements:
   • Homs Offensive: Abdul-Ghani led the coordination of rebel forces in the successful campaign to capture Homs in December 2024, marking a major turning point in the conflict. The city’s fall disrupted regime supply lines and paved the way for the rebels’ advance toward Damascus.
   • Damascus Campaign: Following the fall of Homs, Abdul-Ghani played a critical role in the swift and largely uncontested takeover of Damascus, resulting in the abdication of Bashar al-Assad and the establishment of a transitional government.
   • Northern Syria Operations: Beyond central Syria, Abdul-Ghani has worked with factions operating in Aleppo and Idlib, ensuring a unified strategy against remaining regime forces and rival groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
2. Military Strategy:
   • Abdul-Ghani’s tactics emphasize asymmetrical warfare, leveraging local knowledge, mobility, and decentralized command structures to outmaneuver regime forces.
   • He has been adept at integrating disparate rebel factions, including tribal militias, into cohesive fighting units, enhancing their collective effectiveness.

Connections:

Hassan Abdul-Ghani’s role as a commander places him at the center of Syria’s complex web of alliances and rivalries. His ability to navigate these relationships has been critical to his success.

1. Rebel Military Hierarchy:
   • Abdul-Ghani operates within the broader framework of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of Turkish-backed rebel groups.
   • While maintaining independence, he collaborates closely with other commanders to coordinate operations and allocate resources effectively.
2. Regional and International Relations:
   • Turkey: As a Turkish-backed commander, Abdul-Ghani receives logistical and military support from Ankara. This relationship has been vital to sustaining rebel momentum in northern Syria.
   • United States: While not directly aligned with U.S.-backed Kurdish forces, Abdul-Ghani has engaged in limited coordination with American advisors, particularly in counterterrorism operations targeting ISIS remnants.
   • HTS: Despite occasional tactical cooperation with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Abdul-Ghani has been critical of the group’s extremist ideology and governance style, viewing them as a long-term threat to Syria’s stability.
3. Transitional Government:
   • Abdul-Ghani has expressed support for the Syrian Transitional Government under Mohammed al-Bashir, advocating for a united opposition front.
   • He has participated in discussions aimed at integrating rebel forces into a national military structure, emphasizing the importance of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and avoiding factionalism.

Challenges and Controversies:

Hassan Abdul-Ghani’s prominence in the Syrian conflict has not been without challenges, both operational and political.

1. Fragmented Opposition:
   • While he has succeeded in uniting factions during key campaigns, deep-seated rivalries among opposition groups remain a significant obstacle.
   • Efforts to integrate Kurdish forces into broader rebel operations have been met with resistance, complicating strategies in northern Syria.
2. Humanitarian Concerns:
   • Rebel offensives led by Abdul-Ghani have occasionally drawn criticism for collateral damage and civilian displacement, fueling tensions with local populations.
   • Managing humanitarian needs in captured territories remains a pressing issue, particularly as international aid struggles to reach these areas.
3. Tensions with HTS:
   • Abdul-Ghani’s pragmatic stance on governance and cooperation contrasts sharply with HTS’s hardline Islamist policies, leading to periodic clashes and political friction.
   • His opposition to HTS’s attempts to dominate the post-Assad political landscape has made him a target of the group’s propaganda.

Outlook and Implications for U.S. Interests:

Hassan Abdul-Ghani’s leadership presents both opportunities and risks for U.S. engagement in Syria.

Opportunities:

• Counterterrorism Partner: Abdul-Ghani’s opposition to HTS and ISIS aligns with U.S. objectives to prevent extremist groups from consolidating power.
• Stabilization Efforts: His support for the transitional government and focus on uniting opposition factions could contribute to a more stable post-conflict Syria.
• Regional Cooperation: As a Turkish-backed leader, Abdul-Ghani serves as a potential bridge for U.S.-Turkey coordination in northern Syria.

Risks:

• Factional Rivalries: Deep divisions among rebel groups could undermine Abdul-Ghani’s efforts and prolong instability.
• Humanitarian Fallout: Continued conflict and displacement may exacerbate regional refugee crises, straining U.S. allies like Jordan and Turkey.
• Unintended Consequences: U.S. support for Abdul-Ghani must be carefully calibrated to avoid empowering factions with competing agendas or escalating tensions with Kurdish forces.

4. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Position:

President of Turkey

Background:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s President since 2014 and a dominant political figure since his tenure as Prime Minister beginning in 2003, has played a central role in shaping Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. A staunch advocate for a strong, independent Turkey, Erdoğan has positioned himself as a key regional power broker. His administration has taken an active role in the Syrian conflict, pursuing a multi-pronged strategy that aims to safeguard Turkish security interests, expand its regional influence, and counter threats posed by Kurdish forces near Turkey’s southern border.

Erdoğan’s policies are deeply influenced by domestic political considerations, including maintaining his voter base’s support through a blend of nationalist and Islamist rhetoric, while navigating a challenging economic landscape and rising international scrutiny. These factors shape his assertive and often unilateral approach to foreign policy, particularly in Syria.

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Role in the Syrian Conflict:

President Erdoğan has been instrumental in defining Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, pursuing goals that often conflict with those of other regional and international actors, including the United States, Russia, and Iran. His administration’s priorities include:

1. Countering Kurdish Autonomy:
   • Turkey perceives the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its dominant component, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as extensions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization in Turkey.
   • Erdoğan has launched multiple cross-border operations to dismantle Kurdish territorial control in northern Syria, including Operation Euphrates Shield (2016–2017), Operation Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019). These campaigns aimed to create a “safe zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border while reducing the threat of a Kurdish autonomous region.
   • The recent collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have further complicated Turkey’s efforts, as Kurdish factions adapt to the shifting power dynamics in northern Syria.
2. Support for Syrian Rebel Factions:
   • Turkey has provided extensive military, logistical, and financial support to the Syrian National Army (SNA)and other allied rebel groups. These factions serve as proxies for advancing Turkey’s interests in northern Syria, countering both Kurdish forces and Assad loyalists.
   • Erdoğan’s backing of rebel groups has helped consolidate Turkish influence in Idlib and other areas, but it has also heightened tensions with groups like HTS, which seek to dominate the rebel landscape.
3. Balancing Relations with Major Powers:
   • United States: Erdoğan’s opposition to U.S. support for Kurdish forces has strained U.S.-Turkey relations, despite Turkey’s NATO membership. While Turkey occasionally cooperates with the U.S. on counterterrorism, disagreements over the Kurdish issue remain a significant obstacle.
   • Russia: Turkey’s relationship with Russia is complex, characterized by cooperation and competition. While Ankara and Moscow have coordinated efforts to manage deconfliction zones in Syria, their interests diverge sharply on issues such as Assad’s future and control over Idlib.
   • Iran: Although Turkey and Iran share opposition to Kurdish separatism, their support for opposing factions in Syria places them on opposite sides of the broader conflict.
4. Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis Management:
   • Turkey hosts approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, the largest refugee population in the world. Erdoğan has leveraged this burden in negotiations with the European Union, securing funding in exchange for limiting refugee flows into Europe.
   • The ongoing instability in Syria, particularly following Assad’s abdication, poses a renewed risk of mass displacement, increasing pressure on Turkey’s already strained resources.

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Recent Developments (2024–2025):

1. Post-Assad Maneuvering:
   • The power vacuum left by Assad’s departure has intensified Turkey’s efforts to consolidate its influence in northern Syria. Erdoğan has increased military deployments near Aleppo and Idlib to counter HTS’s expanding control and secure Turkish-backed rebel territories.
   • Turkey is also engaging diplomatically with the Syrian Transitional Government, led by Mohammed al-Bashir, to shape the post-Assad political order.
2. Heightened Tensions with Israel:
   • Turkey and Israel, despite limited cooperation in recent months, are experiencing growing friction as both nations vie for influence in Syria. Turkey’s military buildup near the Golan Heights and its opposition to Israeli strikes in southern Syria have strained relations further.
3. Evolving Relationship with Russia:
   • Russia’s redeployment of naval assets to Libya and reduced military footprint in Syria have shifted the balance of power in the region. Erdoğan is leveraging this development to expand Turkish influence while cautiously navigating the potential for renewed clashes with Russian-backed factions.
4. Internal Political Pressure:
   • With Turkey’s economy struggling under inflation and currency devaluation, Erdoğan faces increasing domestic opposition. His foreign policy in Syria, particularly its financial and human costs, is a growing point of contention among Turkish citizens.

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Connections:

Erdoğan’s administration is deeply embedded in the web of alliances and rivalries defining the Syrian conflict. Key relationships include:

1. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS):
   • Turkey maintains a pragmatic, if uneasy, relationship with HTS, aimed at preventing direct confrontation while limiting the group’s influence over Idlib. Erdoğan has avoided outright support for HTS due to its extremist reputation but has tolerated its presence to counter Assad loyalists and Kurdish forces.
2. Syrian National Army (SNA):
   • The SNA serves as Turkey’s primary proxy force in Syria, receiving direct support from the Turkish military. Erdoğan relies on the SNA to maintain control over Turkish-occupied areas and implement Ankara’s broader objectives.
3. Kurdish Forces:
   • Turkey’s antagonistic relationship with the YPG and SDF is central to Erdoğan’s Syria policy. He views Kurdish territorial ambitions as an existential threat to Turkish sovereignty, prompting continuous military operations to dismantle their influence.
4. United States:
   • The U.S.-Turkey alliance remains strained over conflicting policies in Syria, particularly regarding Kurdish forces. Erdoğan has sought to mend relations with Washington while opposing U.S. support for Kurdish factions.
5. European Union:
   • Erdoğan leverages the refugee crisis as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU, securing financial aid and concessions in exchange for limiting refugee flows. The instability in Syria, however, threatens to overwhelm these agreements.
6. Regional Powers:
   • Iran: Turkey and Iran’s shared opposition to Kurdish separatism is balanced against their competing interests in Syria.
   • Israel: Relations with Israel are marked by tension, with both nations pursuing conflicting agendas in southern Syria and the Golan Heights.

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Outlook and Implications for U.S. Interests:

Erdoğan’s role in Syria presents both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy:

1. Challenges:
   • Kurdish Conflict: Turkey’s relentless targeting of Kurdish forces complicates U.S. counterterrorism operations and undermines efforts to stabilize northern Syria.
   • Proxy Escalations: Turkey’s support for the SNA risks intensifying rivalries among opposition factions, hindering broader stabilization efforts.
2. Opportunities:
   • Diplomatic Engagement: The U.S. can leverage Turkey’s opposition to HTS and shared interests in containing Iranian influence to promote deconfliction and broader cooperation.
   • Humanitarian Coordination: Turkey’s role as a host nation for Syrian refugees positions it as a key partner in managing the regional humanitarian crisis.

5. Vladimir Putin

Position:

President of Russia

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Background:

President Vladimir Putin has led Russia with a pragmatic, non-ideological approach aimed at consolidating Russian influence globally, particularly in regions of strategic importance. The Middle East, including Syria, has been central to Russia’s geopolitical strategy, which focuses on:

1. Regional Stability on Russian Terms:
   • Ensuring that Russia maintains leverage over key players in the Middle East.
   • Preventing what the Kremlin perceives as U.S. or Western European efforts to destabilize the region in ways that could spill over into Russia’s sphere of influence, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
2. Economic and Energy Interests:
   • Protecting and expanding Russia’s energy ventures, including pipeline projects and partnerships in regional oil and gas markets.
   • Securing control over or access to infrastructure that could influence global energy markets.
3. Military and Strategic Presence:
   • Projecting power through a sustained military presence, including at Tartus (naval base) and Khmeimim (airbase), which provide Russia with a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean.
   • Demonstrating military capabilities to reinforce Russia’s role as a counterweight to NATO.

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Role in Syria:

Under Putin, Russia became the principal backer of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, supplying military, economic, and diplomatic support that was crucial to sustaining Assad’s rule during the Syrian civil war. However, Assad’s abrupt abdication in December 2024 has shifted the dynamics, raising questions about Russia’s ability to protect its interests in a rapidly evolving landscape.

1. Support for Assad’s Regime:
   • Russia provided air power, advisors, and ground support to Syrian forces, tipping the balance in key battles, including the recapture of Aleppo in 2016.
   • Putin leveraged Russia’s involvement in Syria to expand its global influence, portraying Russia as an indispensable mediator and power broker.
2. Post-Assad Challenges:
   • HTS Takeover: Russia abstained from intervening against Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as it seized control of key regions, including Damascus and Aleppo. This has been interpreted as a pragmatic move to avoid overextension, particularly given Russia’s focus on the conflict in Ukraine and economic strain from Western sanctions.
   • Unclear Deals: There are indications of potential agreements with Turkey or Israel regarding the handling of the HTS advance, though details remain sparse. Russia may have calculated that avoiding direct confrontation would preserve resources and allow it to focus on higher-priority interests.
3. Relocation of Naval Assets:
   • Russia has begun repositioning some naval assets to Libya, signaling a strategic pivot while maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean. This move underscores a long-term focus on safeguarding energy routes and leveraging instability in the region.

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Connections and Influence:

Russia’s military and diplomatic apparatus is now navigating the post-Assad landscape, engaging with emerging authorities and regional players to protect its interests:

1. Turkey:
   • Russia’s relationship with Turkey is defined by tactical cooperation and strategic rivalry. Both nations have cooperated on deconfliction agreements in Syria, but their interests frequently clash, particularly regarding Kurdish forces and energy pipelines.
2. Iran:
   • Historically aligned with Russia in supporting Assad, Iran’s role in Syria is evolving. With Assad’s departure, Tehran may feel betrayed or sidelined by Moscow’s lack of intervention to prevent HTS’s rise. This has strained Russian-Iranian ties, particularly as Iran looks to expand its influence through proxies.
3. Israel:
   • Russia has maintained a working relationship with Israel, balancing its military presence in Syria with efforts to avoid confrontation. Israel’s recent actions in the Golan Heights have added complexity to this relationship, as Moscow seeks to avoid alienating a key regional power while preserving its role as a mediator.
4. Emerging Syrian Authorities:
   • Russia is engaging with the Syrian Transitional Government led by Mohammed al-Bashir, though cautiously. Moscow aims to maintain leverage in post-Assad Syria, even as its influence wanes.
5. United States:
   • Despite sharp disagreements, particularly over Ukraine, Russia continues to monitor U.S. activities in Syria. Putin likely views U.S. support for Kurdish forces and its counterterrorism efforts as both a challenge and an opportunity to exploit gaps in American policy.

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Recent Developments (2024–2025):

1. Reduced Military Engagement:
   • The war in Ukraine has strained Russian military resources, forcing a reevaluation of its commitments in Syria. This has included scaling back some operations and prioritizing assets critical to Russian strategic interests, such as Tartus and Khmeimim bases.
2. Focus on Energy and Economic Leverage:
   • Russia is using its control over critical Syrian infrastructure, including pipelines and power plants, to maintain influence. However, the rise of HTS and regional instability threaten these assets, prompting a shift in focus to protecting core interests.
3. Shift Toward Libya:
   • As Syria becomes less predictable, Russia is redirecting some resources to Libya, where it seeks to expand its presence and secure influence over Mediterranean energy routes.
4. Diplomatic Maneuvering:
   • Russia is positioning itself as a mediator in the Syrian crisis, advocating for international dialogue to stabilize the region. This allows Moscow to maintain relevance without committing to costly military interventions.

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Implications for U.S. Interests:

Putin’s approach to Syria presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy:

1. Challenges:
   • Russia’s reduced engagement in Syria creates a power vacuum that could be exploited by extremist groups like HTS, complicating U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
   • Moscow’s pivot to Libya and continued influence in energy markets pose long-term strategic concerns for the U.S. and its allies.
2. Opportunities:
   • The strain on Russian resources provides an opening for the U.S. to increase its influence in Syria, particularly through support for moderate factions and humanitarian efforts.
   • Divergences between Russia and Iran could be leveraged to weaken their regional alignment.

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Outlook:

Putin’s policies in Syria reflect a pragmatic adaptation to shifting circumstances. While Russia remains a key player, its reduced military footprint and focus on core interests suggest an opportunity for the U.S. to recalibrate its strategy. Engaging with regional partners, balancing humanitarian and security priorities, and leveraging Russia’s challenges could advance U.S. objectives while mitigating risks in the evolving Middle Eastern landscape.

6. Joe Biden and Donald Trump

Joe Biden

Position: President of the United States (2021–2025)

Background:

President Biden’s administration prioritized rebuilding U.S. alliances and promoting multilateral diplomacy in the Middle East. Following Assad’s ousting in December 2024, Biden emphasized the need for a peaceful and inclusive transition in Syria, aligning with broader U.S. foreign policy goals of counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, and stabilization of volatile regions. His administration approached the Syrian crisis with the following key focuses:

1. Counterterrorism:
   • Continued targeted airstrikes on ISIS strongholds and HTS-controlled areas to prevent extremist groups from consolidating power in the post-Assad vacuum.
   • Strengthened partnerships with Kurdish forces (Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) to maintain pressure on ISIS remnants.
2. Humanitarian Support:
   • Increased funding for refugee aid and stabilization programs to assist neighboring countries like Jordan and Turkey in managing the influx of displaced Syrians.
   • Advocated for the establishment of humanitarian corridors in Syria through international cooperation to mitigate the worsening crisis.
3. Regional Stability:
   • Avoided direct military engagement in Syria while leveraging diplomatic channels to influence key regional players, including Turkey, Israel, and Jordan.
   • Balanced support for Kurdish autonomy with efforts to deconflict with Turkey.
4. Diplomatic Outreach:
   • Called for international cooperation through the United Nations and regional forums to prevent further escalation in Syria.
   • Worked to bring HTS leadership into limited negotiations through intermediaries, aiming to secure non-aggression commitments.

Connections:

• Collaborated with NATO allies, Turkey, and regional partners to stabilize northern Syria and address refugee concerns.
• Maintained coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces to counter ISIS while avoiding alienation of Turkey.
• Engaged Israel on security concerns following its buffer zone expansion in the Golan Heights.

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Donald Trump

Position: President of the United States (2025–Present)

Background:

President Trump’s return to office in January 2025 marked a shift toward prioritizing American strategic interests in the region over humanitarian or multilateral approaches. His administration emphasized reducing U.S. commitments in Syria while leveraging local and regional actors to maintain stability and contain extremism.

1. Strategic Retrenchment:
   • Advocated for a reduced U.S. military footprint in Syria, focusing on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities instead of ground operations.
   • Sought to minimize U.S. involvement in nation-building, leaving post-Assad governance to regional stakeholders.
2. Counterterrorism Efforts:
   • Continued airstrikes against ISIS and HTS, using precision strikes to avoid significant collateral damage.
   • Increased reliance on proxy forces, including the Kurdish-led SDF and tribal coalitions, to maintain pressure on extremist factions.
3. America First Diplomacy:
   • Shifted to a transactional approach, requiring regional allies like Turkey and Israel to assume greater responsibility for stabilizing Syria.
   • Focused on leveraging economic and military aid as bargaining tools to secure cooperation from Middle Eastern allies.
4. Engagement with Regional Powers:
   • Enhanced ties with Israel, supporting its expanded buffer zone in the Golan Heights and reinforcing security coordination.
   • Adopted a more confrontational stance toward Iran, focusing on rolling back Iranian influence in Syria and the broader region.
   • Pressured Turkey to limit its operations against Kurdish forces while maintaining coordination on counter-HTS strategies.

Connections:

• Trump’s administration maintained strong ties with Israel, backing its security actions in Syria.
• Established transactional partnerships with Turkey and other regional powers, emphasizing burden-sharing.
• Worked with Russia and other actors to explore deconfliction measures, prioritizing U.S. operational flexibility in Syria.

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Key Developments Under Both Administrations:

• Counterterrorism Successes:
  Both administrations have continued to degrade ISIS and HTS capabilities, preventing either group from becoming a dominant force in the region.
• Kurdish Relations:
  Biden maintained strong support for the SDF, while Trump shifted to a more transactional relationship, balancing U.S. backing with Turkish sensitivities.
• Humanitarian Impact:
  Biden emphasized international cooperation to address the Syrian refugee crisis, while Trump focused on limiting U.S. financial contributions to regional humanitarian efforts, pushing allies to take greater responsibility.
• Geopolitical Balancing:
  Both leaders faced challenges balancing U.S. interests with those of Israel, Turkey, and Russia, each pursuing their own agendas in the region.

7. António Guterres

– Position: United Nations Secretary-General

– Background: Secretary-General Guterres has called for calm and an inclusive political transition in Syria, highlighting the UN’s role in facilitating dialogue and humanitarian assistance during this critical (https://apnews.com/article/a8ecceee72a66f4d7e6168d6a21b8dc9)

– Connections: The UN is engaging with various Syrian factions, international stakeholders, and humanitarian organizations to support the transition and address the humanitarian needs arising from the conflict.

These individuals and their respective networks are instrumental in shaping Syria’s immediate future, each bringing distinct agendas and influences to the complex post-Assad environment.

In the evolving Syrian conflict, Kurdish forces, primarily the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), play a significant role. The SDF is a Kurdish-led coalition of militias serving as the military wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Their leadership and military units are pivotal in the region’s dynamics.

Key Kurdish Leaders and Military Units:

1. General Mazloum Abdi (also known as Ferhat Abdi Şahin):

– Position: Commander-in-Chief of the SDF.

– Background: General Abdi has been instrumental in leading the SDF, especially during operations against ISIS. He advocates for Kurdish autonomy and has been a central figure in negotiations with various international (https://apnews.com/article/syria-turkey-sdf-pkk-mazloum-abdi-37845f89228d695f9b30fe5931205114)

2. People’s Protection Units (YPG):

– Description: The YPG is the primary component of the SDF, consisting mainly of Kurdish fighters. It has been crucial in defending Kurdish regions and combating extremist groups. (https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups)

3. Women’s Protection Units (YPJ):

– Description: The YPJ is an all-female militia that operates alongside the YPG. They have gained recognition for their role in combat operations and their commitment to gender equality. (https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups)

Current Deployment and Proximity to Key Areas:

– Aleppo:

– Kurdish reinforcements have entered the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood and other Kurdish-controlled areas in and around Aleppo. This movement aims to strengthen their presence amid the shifting control dynamics in the city. (https://www.ft.com/content/cc36948f-98df-45d6-9b5a-558710bb037d)

– Eastern Syria:

– The SDF has launched operations, such as the “Battle of Return,” targeting villages around Deir ez-Zor to counter government forces and assert control over strategic areas. This offensive is part of their broader strategy to consolidate power in key regions of eastern Syria. (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sdf-operations-east-syria-2024-12-05)

Relations with Other Factions:

– Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS):

– While HTS has been a dominant rebel force, the SDF maintains a distinct operational command. There have been instances of both cooperation and conflict between these groups, depending on the evolving tactical and political landscape. For example, the SDF has occasionally coordinated with HTS against pro-Assad forces while simultaneously maintaining ideological and territorial disputes. (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sdf-hts-cooperation-syria-2024)

– Syrian National Army (SNA):

– Backed by Turkey, the SNA has had contentious relations with the SDF, primarily due to Turkey’s opposition to Kurdish autonomy near its borders. This has led to frequent clashes in northern Syria, particularly around Afrin and other key contested areas. (https://www.ft.com/content/99b2c68f-4827-4f93-bb12-c1d835f0f7e4)

International Involvement:

– United States:

– The U.S. has provided significant support to the SDF, particularly during their campaigns against ISIS. This includes training, equipment, and air support. Currently, approximately 900 U.S. troops are stationed in SDF-controlled areas to assist in counterterrorism efforts and ensure regional stability. (https://apnews.com/article/sdf-us-military-syria-2024)

– Turkey:

– Turkey views the SDF, especially its YPG component, as an extension of the PKK, which it considers a terrorist organization. This perspective has led to multiple Turkish military operations targeting SDF positions, further complicating the regional security landscape. (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65510877)

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Other Key Regional Actors

1. Iraqi Leadership and Militias

– Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani:

– Position: Prime Minister of Iraq.

– Involvement: Prime Minister al-Sudani has been urged by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of HTS, to prevent Iraqi armed groups from intervening in the Syrian conflict. Jolani assured that HTS poses no threat to Iraq’s national security. (https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/05122024)

– Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF):

– Description: An umbrella organization of predominantly Shia militias in Iraq, with several factions closely aligned with Iran. Despite historical ties with the Assad regime, Iraqi Shia forces, including major Iranian-affiliated factions, have unanimously decided not to send fighters to Syria to defend Bashar al-Assad. (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraqi-militias-decide-not-to-intervene-syria-2024)

2. Turkish Military Presence

– Turkish Armed Forces:

– Operations: Turkey has conducted multiple military operations in northern Syria, such as “Euphrates Shield” (2016-2017) and “Peace Spring” (2019). Recently, Turkish forces and allied SNA factions have consolidated control over key areas in northern Syria, including parts of Aleppo province. (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkey-syria-operations-update-2024)

3. Israeli Military Leadership in Lebanon

– Israel Defense Forces (IDF):

– Operations: The IDF has increased airstrikes targeting Hezbollah positions in Lebanon and Syrian territory. Israeli leaders are reportedly negotiating a ceasefire with Hezbollah to de-escalate tensions while ensuring their northern border remains secure. (https://www.usnews.com/news/world/israeli-idf-hezbollah-2024-ceasefire)

4. Hezbollah Leadership and Iranian Forces

– Hezbollah:

– Leadership: Following the death of Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike in September 2024, Naim Qassem has assumed leadership. Qassem has vowed to maintain Hezbollah’s presence in Syria and coordinate with Iran to counter HTS advances. (https://www.yahoo.com/news/hezbollah-leader-vows-retaliation-against-israel-2024)

– Iranian Forces:

– Involvement: Iran continues to provide military advisors and support to Shia militias in Syria. However, with Assad’s departure, Iran’s influence faces significant challenges, as it reassesses its role in the conflict. (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-strategy-post-assad-syria-2024)

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Appendix : Competing Hypotheses: Is the Fall of Assad Part of a Coordinated Quagmire Strategy by Russia and Iran?

Hypothesis 1: Russia and Iran orchestrated Assad’s abdication and HTS’s rapid advance to lure anti-Assad forces, Israel, and other actors into a prolonged quagmire.

• Unopposed HTS Advances: HTS’s rapid territorial gains without substantial resistance suggest a coordinated withdrawal, not a military defeat.
• Iran’s Forewarning: Iran reportedly warned Assad about HTS’s buildup, implying advanced intelligence. This raises the likelihood of collaboration with Russia in planning.
• Assad’s Asylum in Moscow: Assad’s immediate relocation under Russian protection appears premeditated rather than improvised.
• Assad’s Sudden Abdication: After years of steadfast resistance, his abrupt surrender suggests alignment with a larger strategic plan.
• Strategic Retreats by Pro-Assad Forces: Avoiding large-scale losses while preserving critical assets indicates calculated repositioning.
• Historical Precedents of Asymmetric Strategy: Both Russia and Iran have previously used long-term attrition tactics to exhaust adversaries.

Hypothesis 2: Assad’s fall was an organic result of cumulative pressure, and HTS capitalized on systemic regime weakness.

• HTS’s Growing Strength: HTS’s improved organizational capabilities explain its recent successes without external orchestration.
• Prolonged Strain on the Assad Regime: Years of war, sanctions, and limited international support made the regime’s collapse inevitable.
• Lack of Direct Russian and Iranian Intervention: Previous decisive actions (e.g., Aleppo) by these allies contrast with the lack of immediate response, suggesting they were unprepared.
• Assad’s Limited Options: Moscow’s asylum offer could be a last resort, not part of a coordinated strategy.
• Historical Patterns of Collapse: The chaotic aftermath aligns with the collapses of other authoritarian regimes in similar conditions.

Analysis of Evidence:

Evidence	Supports H₁	Supports H₂
HTS advances were unopposed	✓	✓
Iran warned Assad about HTS buildup	✓
Assad’s asylum in Moscow	✓	✓
Assad’s sudden abdication	✓
Pro-Assad forces retreated strategically	✓
HTS’s growing organizational strength		✓
Regime collapse due to cumulative strain		✓
Lack of intervention by Russia and Iran		✓
Historical patterns of authoritarian collapse		✓

Appendix: Bayesian Analysis of Hypotheses: Was Assad’s Fall a Coordinated Quagmire Strategy by Russia and Iran?

This Bayesian analysis evaluates two competing hypotheses regarding the abdication of President Bashar al-Assad and the subsequent advances by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It incorporates evidence, mitigating factors, and posterior probabilities to determine which hypothesis is more plausible.

Hypotheses:

1. H₁: Russia and Iran orchestrated Assad’s abdication and HTS’s rapid advance to lure anti-Assad forces, Israel, and other actors into a prolonged quagmire.
2. H₂: Assad’s fall was an organic result of cumulative pressure, and HTS capitalized on systemic regime weakness.

Priors:

P(H₁) = 0.5, P(H₂) = 0.5

Evidence and Likelihood Assignments:

The following table summarizes the likelihood of each piece of evidence under both hypotheses:

Evidence	P(E|H₁)	P(E|H₂)
HTS advances were unopposed	0.7	0.6
Iran warned Assad about HTS buildup	0.8	0.5
Assad’s asylum in Moscow	0.7	0.5
Assad’s sudden abdication	0.6	0.4
Strategic retreats by pro-Assad forces	0.8	0.5
Mitigating factors (e.g., Assad’s fatigue, missteps)	0.5	0.7

Joint Probabilities:

The likelihood of each hypothesis given the evidence is calculated using Bayes’ Theorem:

For H₁:

• P(E₁|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.7 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.35
• P(E₂|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.8 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.4
• P(E₃|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.7 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.35
• P(E₄|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.6 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.3
• P(E₅|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.8 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.4
• P(Mitigating Factors|H₁) ⋅ P(H₁) = 0.5 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.25

Total for H₁: 0.35 + 0.4 + 0.35 + 0.3 + 0.4 + 0.25 = 2.05

For H₂:

• P(E₁|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.6 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.3
• P(E₂|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.5 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.25
• P(E₃|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.5 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.25
• P(E₄|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.4 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.2
• P(E₅|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.5 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.25
• P(Mitigating Factors|H₂) ⋅ P(H₂) = 0.7 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.35

Total for H₂: 0.3 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.2 + 0.25 + 0.35 = 1.6

Normalization:

The denominator P(E) is the sum of the totals for H₁ and H₂:

P(E) = 2.05 + 1.6 = 3.65

Posterior Probabilities:

• P(H₁|E) = 2.05 / 3.65 ≈ 0.56 (56%)
• P(H₂|E) = 1.6 / 3.65 ≈ 0.44 (44%)

Conclusion:

After incorporating mitigating factors, Hypothesis 1 (quagmire strategy) remains more likely, with a probability of 56%. However, the organic collapse hypothesis (H₂) accounts for 44%, reflecting the significant influence of Assad’s personal decisions, regional dynamics, and systemic pressures on his regime.

The Bayesian analysis suggests that the situation is best understood as a convergence of the two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 (H₁) likely represents a strategic adaptation by Russia and Iran to mitigate the effects of Hypothesis 2 (H₂), capitalizing on Assad’s missteps and the organic collapse of his regime. This combined framework highlights the opportunistic recalibration by larger geopolitical forces in the wake of regime vulnerabilities, rather than an entirely premeditated plan.

This nuanced conclusion provides a structured lens to understand the unfolding events in Syria, emphasizing both the agency of local actors and the strategic adjustments of external powers like Russia and Iran. It underscores the complexity of the Syrian conflict and the interplay between organic pressures and external interventions.

Appendix: Analyst Comments: Expanded Assessment

The current trajectory in Syria suggests a likely escalation of instability, paralleling other destabilized states in the region. The vacuum created by Assad’s abdication will exacerbate divisions among competing factions, each vying for control. The rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) further complicates the situation, as their governance lacks legitimacy, alienates minorities, and risks deepening societal fragmentation.

Comparative Framework: Potential Scenarios

1. Libya Post-Gaddafi

• Libya’s descent into chaos following Gaddafi’s fall provides a cautionary parallel. Similar to Libya:
  • Competing Factions: HTS, remnants of the Assad regime, Kurdish groups, and Islamist factions may engage in prolonged conflicts.
  • Militarization: The proliferation of unregulated weapons and militias could replicate Libya’s lawlessness.

2. Iraq During the Rise of ISIS

• The power vacuum in post-Saddam Iraq enabled ISIS’s rise, leading to regional destabilization:
  • Extremist Dominance: HTS and other jihadist groups could establish quasi-governance in parts of Syria, destabilizing neighboring regions.
  • Sectarian Violence: Targeted attacks on minorities may trigger mass displacement and cycles of retaliatory violence.

3. Yemen’s Ongoing Conflict

• Yemen’s protracted conflict, driven by external powers, is a stark warning for Syria:
  • Proxy Involvement: Turkey, Iran, and Israel pursue conflicting objectives, fueling proxy wars.
  • Prolonged Instability: External interventions could perpetuate factionalism and hinder conflict resolution.

Complicating Factors

1. Regional Instability and Proxy Wars

• Turkey: Ankara’s focus on Kurdish suppression through cross-border operations increases tensions with HTS and other factions.
• Israel: Israel’s strikes targeting Iranian presence and Hezbollah destabilize southern Syria.
• Iran: Tehran’s support for militias intensifies conflict with Sunni factions and Western-backed groups.
• Kurds: Kurdish groups (e.g., Syrian Democratic Forces) seeking autonomy create further divisions and provoke Turkish aggression.

2. Iraq’s Spillover Effects

• Iraq’s militia struggles, porous borders, and arms trafficking amplify cross-border insurgency, deepening Syria’s instability.

3. Global Tensions

• Diplomatic Paralysis: Strained U.S.-Russia relations and fragmented alliances hinder collective action.
• Economic Pressures: Global inflation and resource competition limit international aid and conflict mitigation efforts.

Anticipated Outcomes

• Short Term:
  • Escalating violence as HTS consolidates power in contested regions.
  • Displacement of minorities and refugees into Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.
• Medium Term:
  • Emergence of fragmented enclaves resembling Somalia’s lawlessness.
  • Expansion of jihadist ideology beyond Syria’s borders.
• Long Term:
  • Regional instability spilling over into Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan as proxy conflicts intensify.

Recommendations for All Regional and International Stakeholders

1. Comprehensive Multilateral Dialogue:Facilitate direct and inclusive negotiations among all relevant regional powers (Turkey, Iran, Israel, Russia) under international auspices. This dialogue must prioritize:
   • De-escalation of proxy conflicts.
   • Agreements on territorial sovereignty and Kurdish autonomy.
   • Establishing frameworks for reducing sectarian violence.
2. Emergency Stabilization Measures:Deploy internationally monitored humanitarian and stabilization teams to:
   • Establish secure zones for civilians, especially minorities, near conflict lines.
   • Prevent extremist groups from exploiting governance vacuums.
3. Economic Reconstruction Initiatives:Launch an international economic assistance program targeting infrastructure rebuilding and poverty alleviation to undermine extremist recruitment efforts.
4. Localized Power-Sharing Agreements:Encourage power-sharing frameworks that integrate Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and Christian leadership, reducing factionalism and building governance legitimacy.
5. Counter-Extremism Campaigns:Invest in educational and ideological initiatives that counter extremist propaganda and promote pluralistic governance models.

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Recommendations for the Antiochian Orthodox Church and Other Christian Communities

1. Emergency Response Planning:
   • Establish evacuation plans and secure safe routes for vulnerable populations in cooperation with international humanitarian organizations.
   • Stockpile emergency supplies within monasteries and churches as temporary refuges.
2. Community Defense Partnerships:
   • Coordinate with local defense forces (e.g., Kurdish and moderate Sunni militias) to protect churches, monasteries, and Orthodox communities.
   • Train community members in basic security measures while advocating non-violence as the guiding principle.
3. Preservation of Religious Heritage:
   • Digitally document religious artifacts and cultural heritage for international advocacy.
   • Work with UNESCO and other cultural bodies to secure “protected status” for significant religious sites.
4. Strengthened Regional Cooperation Among Orthodox Communities:
   • Build alliances with other Christian groups (e.g., Syriacs, Assyrians) for unified advocacy and resource pooling.
   • Leverage relationships with international Orthodox Patriarchates to lobby for global intervention and aid.
5. International Advocacy and Diplomacy:
   • Engage international organizations like the UNHCR, Red Cross, and major Western governments to advocate for minority rights and mobilize resources.
   • Collaborate with the Vatican and other religious leaders to amplify the plight of Syrian Christians on global platforms.

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Conclusion

The likelihood of targeted violence escalating into genocide against Christian communities in Syria is a significant concern given the historical patterns of sectarian violence in the region, the rise of extremist factions like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the power vacuum created by Assad’s abdication. These concerns are grounded in evidence and historical precedents, including:

• Extremist Ideologies: HTS and similar factions have a documented history of targeting religious minorities. Reports from HTS-controlled areas have detailed forced conversions, desecration of religious sites, and extrajudicial killings of Christian clergy and laity (Human Rights Watch).
• Weak Governance: Historical parallels, such as Iraq during the rise of ISIS, show how power vacuums and fractured leadership create environments where minorities are systematically targeted. Syria’s fragmented governance and HTS’s ideological rigidity increase this risk (Council on Foreign Relations).
• International Inaction: Previous delays in global response to genocides, such as in Rwanda and the Yazidi genocide by ISIS, demonstrate how inaction can embolden extremist factions and worsen the plight of vulnerable groups (United Nations Reports).

Syria stands at a critical juncture where prolonged instability and conflict are not only likely but have the potential to escalate into atrocities against vulnerable minority groups, including Christians. The growing influence of extremist ideologies, historical precedents of targeted violence, and the current power vacuum reinforce the urgency for action.

The Antiochian Orthodox Church, along with other Christian communities such as the Syriacs and Assyrians, must implement immediate measures to safeguard their populations and heritage. These actions include robust evacuation plans, security collaborations with local factions, and proactive international advocacy. Simultaneously, preserving cultural and religious artifacts through partnerships with UNESCO and similar bodies should remain a priority.

Regional and international stakeholders have a moral and strategic responsibility to intervene decisively. Diplomatic engagement among major powers, the establishment of internationally monitored safe zones, and counter-extremism initiatives must form the cornerstone of these efforts. Without a unified and urgent response, the risk of atrocities spiraling into systematic genocide remains dangerously high.

These measures, while ambitious, represent the most viable opportunity to stabilize Syria and protect its diverse religious and ethnic communities from irreparable harm. The lessons of inaction from Rwanda and the Yazidi crises must inform a proactive approach to prevent further atrocities in this critical region.