Order of the Black Shield Silent Wing Intelligence Report- US Strike on Iran

✠ BLUF – Order of the Black Shield – Silent Wing Tenebrae Bellum Report: Operation Midnight Hammer (June 2025)

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):

The U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran in June 2025, code-named Operation Midnight Hammer, represent a doctrinal and strategic rupture. Initiated on intelligence assessments of capability rather than confirmed intent, the operation marked a radical departure from deterrence norms and violated international expectations under the IAEA and NPT frameworks. Iran had not left the NPT, nor had weaponization resumed, but its stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium made it a de facto threshold state. The strikes—while tactically precise—inflicted deep damage not only on Iran’s nuclear sites, but on the global non-proliferation regime, setting a precedent for first-strike justification based on fear.

Western justifications framed the operation as preemptive self-defense against an imminent nuclear breakout, but non-Western and critical voices condemned it as illegal aggression, citing IAEA oversight and Iran’s NPT compliance. Iran retaliated in a calibrated manner, signaling strategic restraint while activating asymmetric avenues (proxy militias, cyber operations, and diplomatic alliances). Global alliances began realigning: Iran accelerated integration with Russia, China, and BRICS, while the West absorbed reputational damage over bypassed diplomacy and controversial legality.

Strategic consequences include the erosion of the nuclear taboo, increased likelihood of future regional arms races (notably Saudi and South Korean interest in nuclear capability), and a shift in the threshold doctrine from intent to mere capability—undermining trust-based arms control. The Order’s Silent Wing assesses this event as a catalyst for cascading instability and doctrinal inversion, demanding heightened vigilance and theological discernment.

Silent Wing’s doctrinal conclusion: The veil between restraint and annihilation has been rent. The “sword of capability” now governs international reaction more than intent or justice. The attack may delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but it fuels their justification. The altar of non-proliferation has been struck by those once sworn to guard it. We enter a new liturgical phase of war—where force precedes truth, and thrones begin to shake.

IAEA & Nuclear Inspection History (2022–2025)

Rising Enrichment & Stockpiles: Over 2022–2025, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports documented Iran’s steady advance in uranium enrichment beyond JCPOA limits. Inspectors confirmed that by early 2023 Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7% U-235 in laboratory samples at Fordow – just shy of weapons-grade (90%). Tehran claimed this was an “unintended fluctuation” during 60% enrichment. The IAEA noted that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% had grown to 87.5 kg by Feb 2023 – more than double the ~42 kg defined as a “significant quantity” (approximate amount for one bomb). (Western intelligence assessments cautioned that ~55 kg of 60% HEU might be required for one weapon due to inefficiencies.) By mid-2025, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium had swelled further; IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reported “more than 400 kg” of up-to-60% uranium under Iran’s safeguards – enough, if fully enriched, for several nuclear warheads.

Threshold Nuclear State Status: Iran’s enrichment milestones effectively made it a “threshold” nuclear weapons state by 2023–2024. Western officials noted that reaching 60% purity is “90% of the way” to weapons-grade. By July 2024 the US State Department assessed Iran’s breakout time – the time to produce one bomb’s worth of 90% HEU – at only 1–2 weeks. In June 2025, the White House publicly warned that Iran “has all that it needs” to build a nuclear weapon and could do so within “a couple of weeks” if Ayatollah Khamenei gave the order. “Once you’re at 60%, you are essentially a threshold nuclear weapons state,” explained U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This marked a stark contrast with 2015, when the JCPOA had pushed Iran’s breakout time beyond a year.

IAEA Monitoring & NPT Compliance: Throughout this period, the IAEA struggled to monitor Iran’s rapidly expanding program. After the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran progressively reduced IAEA access in retaliation. In June 2022, following an IAEA Board censure, Iran disconnected or removed multiple monitoring cameras and limiters at nuclear sites, hampering verification efforts (the Agency termed this a “serious challenge”to continuity of knowledge). Grossi warned that Iran’s transparency measures had been “significantly curtailed”, though Iran continued to implement basic NPT safeguards. Notably, as of mid-2025 Iran still had not officially quit the NPT, and Grossi affirmed to the UN Security Council that Iran’s known stockpiles remained under safeguards with “no evidence” of nuclear material diversion for weapons. However, he underscored the urgency of restoring inspections to ensure none of Iran’s ~400 kg of 60%-enriched uranium had been removed or repurposed.

IAEA Findings vs. Iranian Explanations: IAEA reports from 2022–2025 provide a mixed picture. The Agency repeatedly confirmed that Iran’s enrichment level far exceeds any civilian need (3.67% under JCPOA) and has no plausible civilian justification for 60% enrichment. Iran, for its part, officially maintained that it never sought nuclear weapons and that its activities were peaceful. When inspectors found traces of near-weapons-grade 83.7% uranium at Fordow in January 2023, Iranian officials (AEC spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi) insisted this was a momentary spike during 60% production, not a deliberate effort to stockpile 84% material. Iran eventually allowed senior IAEA official Massimo Aparo to visit and “check the alleged enrichment” in February 2023, after which Iran claimed the issue was “resolved” to the IAEA’s satisfaction. (The IAEA has not publicly confirmed Iran’s resolution claim, and the matter of unexplained uranium traces at undeclared sites remained a point of contention in 2025.)

IAEA Warnings & Reactions to Attack Rhetoric: The IAEA’s leadership walked a careful line amid escalating US-Israeli warnings. Director General Grossi frequently highlighted that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile (which by early 2023 could theoretically yield “several” nuclear bombs if further enriched) posed a serious proliferation risk. At the same time, Grossi strongly opposed any military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In March 2023, he pointedly reminded that IAEA General Conference resolutions state “armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place”, warning that such strikes carry extreme danger of radioactive release. This stance was reiterated when conflict erupted in 2025: Grossi briefed the UN that bombing Iran’s active nuclear installations risked a grave radiological disaster and was “never” an acceptable solution. He specifically cautioned that an attack on the operational Bushehr nuclear power plant could cause a massive radiation release across hundreds of kilometers – a scenario with severe humanitarian and environmental consequences. In summary, from 2022 to 2025 the IAEA served as both watchdog and whistle-blower: reporting Iran’s rapid approach to nuclear-weapons capability, yet simultaneously refuting exaggerations (emphasizing Iran had not built a bomb) and condemning the idea of preemptive strikes as a violation of international norms.

Western Intelligence and Public Justifications

Public Rationale for Strikes: The United States and its key allies framed the June 2025 military strike on Iran as a regrettable but necessary step to prevent an imminent nuclear-armed Iran. The White House Press Secretary announced on June 19, 2025 that “Iran has all that it needs to achieve a nuclear weapon” and that all it lacked was a political decision, implying the threat of a sudden breakout was untenable. U.S. President Donald Trump, in a televised address after the strikes, called the operation a “spectacular military success” that “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s key nuclear facilities. The official U.S. position was that diplomacy had been given every chance and Iran had instead raced toward a bomb, leaving “no option but to act” in defense of global security. The strikes were cast as preemptive self-defense on behalf of not only the U.S. and Israel, but the broader international community threatened by a nuclear Iran.

Intelligence Assessments Cited: Western officials buttressed their case with alarming intelligence claims (some declassified, some leaked). In early 2023, the U.S. Defense Department warned Congress that Iran could produce one bomb’s worth of fissile material in “about 12 days”, down from a year in 2018. By mid-2025, U.S. intelligence agencies assessed Iran had enriched enough uranium (if further purified) for “several” nuclear weapons. However, it was also acknowledged (behind closed doors) that Iran had not resumed weaponization work or made a decision to build a warhead. Notably, in March 2025 the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) testified that “to the best of our knowledge” Iran’s Supreme Leader had not ordered a bomb built and that Iran’s 2003-era weaponization program remained shelved. This nuanced view was largely downplayed in public. President Trump openly dismissed the DNI’s caution, saying “I don’t care what she said, I think they [Iran] were very close” to a bomb. In his narrative, any distinction between capability and intent was lost – the sheer capability was deemed unacceptable. Similarly, Israel’s government insisted Iran’s nuclear advances constituted an existential threat: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly stated in 2023–25 that Israel would never allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, even if it meant acting alone. These dire assessments set the stage for public support (or at least acceptance) of the strikes in Western capitals.

Coalition and Allies’ Statements: Key U.S. allies either openly endorsed the strikes or offered implicit support. Israel, which had already been trading blows with Iran directly (see below), praised the U.S. action – Netanyahu said he “knew in advance” about the American operation and that Israel was “very close” to achieving its war aims with U.S. help. The United Kingdom and France – part of the P5+1 that negotiated the JCPOA – expressed understanding of the U.S. decision, reiterating that Iran’s escalatory nuclear breaches and regional aggression left no diplomatic room. UK officials cited Iran’s enrichment to near-weapons grade as a blatant breach of the NPT’s spirit. NATO’s Secretary General stopped short of a formal endorsement (since NATO as an alliance was not involved), but emphasized that all nations have the right to self-defense and highlighted Iran’s provision of drones to Russia and attacks on commercial shipping as destabilizing activities. Privately, NATO members were consulted by Washington; none attempted to restrain the U.S., though some (Germany, Turkey) voiced concern about the conflict’s spillover.

✠ Operation “Midnight Hammer” – Strike Overview

The American strikes—officially code-named Operation Midnight Hammer—were executed on 21 June 2025 with the objective of delivering a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. According to Pentagon statements and defense intelligence briefings, three critical sites were targeted:

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

Natanz Enrichment Complex

Esfahan Uranium Conversion and Metallurgy Facility

The operation marked the first combat deployment of the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)—a 30,000-pound deep-penetration bomb—dropped from B-2 Spirit stealth bombers launched from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. These bombers conducted nonstop missions lasting over 37 hours.

Simultaneously, a barrage of Tomahawk cruise missiles was launched from a U.S. Navy submarine stationed in the Arabian Sea, aimed at Iranian air defenses, radar systems, and command nodes surrounding the nuclear sites. The operation involved over 125 aircraft, including:

F-22 Raptors and F/A-18s as fighter escorts,

EA-18G Growlers for electronic warfare,

KC-135 and KC-10 tankers for aerial refueling.

In a televised Oval Office address, President Trump hailed the mission as “a complete success,” emphasizing the lack of American casualties and showcasing satellite images as evidence. He declared, “The biggest damage took place far below ground level. Bullseye!”—an apparent reference to the MOP strikes on deeply buried centrifuge halls at Fordow and Natanz.

Western Media & Narrative Framing: Western media largely echoed the official justification in the immediate aftermath. Prominent outlets like The New York Times and BBC ran headlines about “Iran’s nuclear program dealt a major setback”, emphasizing the removal of an immediate nuclear threat. These reports cited unnamed intelligence sources saying Iran’s path to a bomb had been delayed by at least several years. Many Western analysts writing op-eds supported the strikes as a unfortunate “last resort” made necessary by Iranian intransigence. However, there was also notable skepticism and investigative reporting: for example, ABC News and Radio Free Europe obtained satellite photos indicating that while heavy damage was evident at certain sites, parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (especially Fordow, tunneled under a mountain) might not have been fully destroyed. A Radio Free Europe analysis showed Fordow’s main tunnel entrance had collapsed and some surface buildings were obliterated, but the subterranean chambers appeared intact with only smoke and minor ground scarring visible. Western reporters pressed U.S. officials on this, and President Trump’s aides conceded that some deeply buried facilities were “hardened beyond the point of total destruction”, though they insisted the strikes achieved “strategic paralysis” of Iran’s program. Additionally, opposition voices in Western countries raised legal and moral questions. In the US, a few lawmakers (mostly in the opposition Democratic Party) argued that the strike was unauthorized by Congress and risked another Middle East war. A U.S. Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee disclosed that as of a week before the strike, intel briefings still assessed “Iran posed no imminent threat” and was not on the verge of an actual weapon – highlighting a disconnect between intelligence and the decision to attack. Nonetheless, the prevailing narrative in Western public discourse was that the strike, while carrying risks, prevented a nuclear Iran and upheld the “red line” against nuclear proliferation.

Leaked/Declassified Intel and Propaganda: Some declassified satellite imagery and documents were released by the ODNI to bolster the case after the fact. This included diagrams allegedly from Iranian computers (obtained via Mossad) showing experimental work on nuclear warhead fitting – evidence the U.S. said “could no longer be ignored.” Skeptics noted these were reminiscent of the pre-2003 “smoking gun” memos and cautioned about possible misinformation. In parallel, influence campaigns by United Against Nuclear Iran (a hawkish advocacy group) and segments of the Israeli press worked to justify the strikes, citing past Iranian deception. Western officials compared the situation to Israel’s 1981 Osirak strike and 2007 Syria strike, arguing that preventive action had historical precedent to stop clandestine WMD programs. Importantly, President Trump and Israeli PM Netanyahu openly tied the Iran strikes to a broader policy shift: they stated Iran’s “malign activities” – from supporting Hezbollah to supplying drones to Russia – were no longer tolerable, and neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability was key to restoring regional order. This expansive framing fed speculation that the strikes were as much about Iran’s regime behavior as its nuclear material, a point Iranian officials seized upon to claim the West’s true aim was regime change.

Non-Western and Critical Perspectives

Tehran’s Official Response: Iran’s leadership reacted with outrage, framing the U.S. strikes as a flagrant act of war and vowing vigorous retaliation. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (speaking in English at an emergency OIC meeting in Istanbul) blasted the attacks as “outrageous” and warned “Washington is solely and fully responsible for the dangerous consequences and far-reaching implications of its act of aggression.” He accused the U.S. of “betraying diplomacy” by bombing Iran in the midst of negotiations, noting Iran had been engaged in talks up to the day before the strikes. Araghchi charged that President Trump “deceived his own voters” by abandoning his non-intervention promises and “submitting to the wishes of a wanted war criminal [Netanyahu]”. This rhetoric set the tone: Iran cast itself as the victim of unlawful aggression, comparing Trump to George W. Bush and painting the scenario as Iraq 2003 redux.

Supreme Leader’s Call to Jihad: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addressed the nation on June 18, 2025 in a fiery speech (from a secure location due to ongoing conflict). He did not acknowledge the U.S. directly at first, but focused on Israel: “The Zionist enemy has made a grave mistake, committed a great crime; it must be punished and is being punished right now.” He urged the Muslim world to unite in muqawama (resistance) against Israel and its supporters. Khamenei’s words in Persian underscored his point – “دشمن صهیونیستی … باید مجازات بشود و … دارد مجازات می‌شود” (“The Zionist enemy committed a big mistake… it must be punished and is being punished right now.”). Although he didn’t mention America by name in that first address, the implicit target was clear. By framing it as Israel’s “great crime,” Khamenei sought to maintain focus on Israel’s role and perhaps avoid directly provoking the far more powerful U.S. in rhetoric. However, two days later, after the U.S. strikes, Khamenei’s tone sharpened: he likened the U.S. and Israel to “devils who will burn in the flames of their own igniting”. He promised that Israel would face a “bitter and painful fate” for dragging the region into war.

Iran’s Military & IRGC – Threats and Action: Iran’s military apparatus (regular Army Artesh and the Revolutionary Guard IRGC) moved to a war footing. Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, declared that the United States had “entered the war clearly and directly” by violating Iran’s sovereignty with the strikes. “The criminal US must know that… the hands of Islam’s fighters have been freed to take any action against its interests and military,” Mousavi said, effectively threatening U.S. forces in the region. The IRGC released a statement warning the U.S. to “expect regrettable responses”. IRGC commanders enumerated U.S. bases across the Middle East within reach of Iranian missiles, noting the “number, dispersion, and size” of these bases “has doubled [America’s] vulnerability”. Within 48 hours, Tehran demonstrated its willingness to respond militarily: on June 23, Iran launched ballistic missile attacks on two U.S. installations – Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Ain al-Assad Air Base in Iraq. These strikes were carefully calibrated. Iran announced on state TV that it fired a number of missiles “matching the number of bombs” the U.S. used, signaling a tit-for-tat ethos. It also claimed it deliberately targeted infrastructure away from populated areas to minimize casualties. Indeed, Qatar reported no casualties, and that its defenses intercepted the missiles. Iran’s state media hailed the attack as “a mighty and successful response” to American aggression, while emphasizing (for international audiences) that Iran was not seeking full war.

Claims of Limited Damage & Legal Justifications: Iranian officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. strikes on its nuclear program. Within hours of the bombing, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization stated that all nuclear material had been preemptively removed from Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, and that “damage was only to infrastructure – like a scratch on the lion’s skin.” Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA told reporters that “our enrichment capability remains intact in other locations”, hinting Iran had contingencies. Tehran argued the strikes were a violation of international law, filing a letter with the UN Security Council accusing the U.S. of “armed aggression against a UN member state” in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Iranian lawyers and Foreign Ministry spokesmen pointed out that the facilities struck were under IAEA safeguards, so attacking them not only set a dangerous precedent but “assaulted the international non-proliferation regime.” Foreign Minister Araghchi, in Moscow, publicly appealed: “If such lawlessness goes unanswered, no nation’s peaceful installations are safe. Today Iran, tomorrow any country that defies Western diktat could be next.” Russia and China echoed these legal arguments in the UN (see below).

Russia’s Stance and Support: The Russian Federation firmly backed Iran diplomatically, though it stopped short of direct military intervention. President Vladimir Putin condemned the U.S. strikes as “absolutely unprovoked aggression… [with] no justification.” Meeting Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi at the Kremlin on June 23, Putin said the attacks were “pushing the world towards a very dangerous line.” He promised to “assist the Iranian people”, without publicly specifying how – a carefully worded pledge suggesting humanitarian, diplomatic, and possibly covert military aid. Behind closed doors, Araghchi delivered a letter from Ayatollah Khamenei to Putin pleading for advanced air defenses and UN action. Russian officials were non-committal: Deputy FM Sergei Ryabkov said Russia’s “strategic partnership with Iran is unbreakable” and that Iran had the “full right to defend itself”, but the formal Russo-Iran alliance did not include a defense treaty. At the UN, Russia took a leading role. Moscow (along with Beijing) tabled a draft UNSC resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and condemning the violation of Iranian sovereignty. In a scathing Security Council speech, Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzialikened the U.S. justifications to the false WMD claims against Iraq: “Again we’re being asked to believe the U.S.’s fairytales… This cements our conviction that history has taught our U.S. colleagues nothing.” (Russian: “опять нас просят поверить американским сказкам… история ничему не научила наших американских коллег.”) The Russian Foreign Ministry also warned that if states can interpret self-defense however they wish (as the U.S. did), “the world will descend into chaos” – a pointed critique by FM Sergei Lavrov. While Russia’s practical assistance was limited (partly due to its ongoing war in Ukraine), it did reportedly expedite delivery of some S-400 air defense systems and intelligence sharing with Iran’s military. Russia’s state media (RT, Sputnik) amplified Tehran’s narrative, emphasizing civilian casualties, and accusing the U.S. of imperialist motives. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev even blustered that Moscow could consider giving Iran nuclear warheads to deter the West (a statement the Kremlin later downplayed as hyperbole).

China and Other Asian Powers: China strongly condemned the strikes and positioned itself as a mediator. At the UN, China’s ambassador Fu Cong lambasted the U.S. for “adding fuel to the fire” and demanded all parties (“especially Israel”) cease hostilities immediately to prevent “the spillover of war”. Beijing’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun asserted that attacking IAEA-supervised nuclear facilities is “a serious violation of the United Nations Charter” and criticized Washington for undermining its own credibility. China coordinated with Russia in the UNSC to push for a ceasefire resolution and sent envoys to Tehran and Tel Aviv. Notably, China organized the evacuation of over 3,000 Chinese citizens from Iran as a precaution, illustrating its concern about escalation. India, which has strategic ties with both the U.S. and Iran, expressed deep concern and called for “maximum restraint by all sides.” Indian officials privately noted that India would not support any move to sanction Iran at the UN, as India viewed the strikes as unsanctioned use of force. Turkey – a NATO member but also a regional power with ties to Iran – convened the OIC emergency summit in Istanbul. President Erdoğan used that forum to decry the U.S. and Israeli attacks “in the strongest terms.” Turkish rhetoric was sharp: calling the strikes “a grave mistake” and hinting that Turkey might reconsider defense cooperation with Israel. However, Turkey stopped short of any military steps and continued its delicate balancing act. Arab States: The reaction in the Arab world was mixed. Qatar, caught in the middle as host to a U.S. base that Iran struck, condemned Iran’s missile attack on its soil as “a flagrant violation of our sovereignty and international law”. At the same time, Qatar’s emir reportedly urged Washington to de-escalate and offered to mediate between the U.S. and Iran, given Qatar’s historically good offices. Saudi Arabia and the UAE publicly voiced support for “any action that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon” but also called for dialogue to resolve the crisis – a careful line reflecting their quiet approval of hitting Iran’s nukes, tempered by fear of Iranian retaliation against them.

Global Media (Non-Western): International media outside the West offered diverging perspectives:

In the Middle East, outlets like Al Jazeera provided more even-handed coverage. Al Jazeera English noted Iran’s claim that the U.S. strikes were meant to “revive the dying Zionist regime” and that instead they “expand the scope of legitimate targets” for Iran. AJ highlighted civilian suffering on both sides – reporting Iran’s Ministry of Health figures of 400+ Iranians (mostly civilians) killed by Israeli air raids, and 24 Israelis killed by Iranian missile strikes. It aired footage of large anti-American protests in Tehran with chants of “Death to America & Israel,” but also noted life in Tehran appeared “largely unaffected”immediately after the strikes aside from those rallies.

Iranian state media (PressTV, Tehran Times, Fars News) toed the regime line. They claimed the strikes achieved little militarily – citing that Iran had safely removed nuclear materials – while causing unjust civilian casualties. PressTV ran segments from the strike sites, showing craters at Natanz and lab buildings in Esfahan reduced to rubble, but then featuring Iranian technicians vowing to rebuild “even underground, if needed.” A recurring theme was that Iran had been victim of “nuclear terrorism” (invoking previous covert attacks as well) and now “open war.” These outlets emphasized legal arguments, interviewing international law professors to call the attack “the 21st century’s Pearl Harbor against international law.” They also broadcast heart-wrenching images of wounded civilians in Tehran after Israeli airstrikes hit a university and the Red Crescent building.

Russian media (RT, TASS, Pravda) closely followed the Kremlin’s stance. RT’s headlines spoke of “U.S. aggression plunging Middle East into chaos.” They gave ample airtime to Iranian and Palestinian commentators who saw the conflict as an expansion of the Israel-Gaza war. One RT segment featured a panel accusing the U.S. of manufacturing a pretext, much like Iraq 2003, to attack a defiant Iran. TASS emphasized Russia’s attempts to stop the war at the UN and portrayed the U.S. as isolated (noting the UNSC ceasefire resolution gained 11 of 15 votes, vetoed only by US, UK, France). Meanwhile, Sputnik in Arabic targeted Middle East audiences by highlighting that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were “staying neutral,” implicitly criticizing them for not defending Iran more.

Chinese media (Global Times, Xinhua) struck a tone of stern admonition. A Global Times editorial condemned the U.S. and Israel for violating Iran’s sovereignty and warned that “external military interference will never bring peace, only deepen regional hatred and trauma.” Beijing’s outlets underscored calls for negotiations and portrayed China as a responsible power trying to broker peace. Notably, CGTN (Chinese state TV) ran an interview with Iran’s ambassador in Beijing, who reassured that China’s investments in Iran (under the 25-year cooperation pact) would be protected, an implicit message that Iran remained stable and open for business despite the strikes.

Allegations of War Crimes and Civilian Harm: Non-Western and critical voices raised pointed questions about possible violations of international humanitarian law. Iran claimed that the U.S. strikes, in addition to the nuclear sites, damaged a clinic at Natanz and killed several security personnel – thus, Iran called it an intentional attack on a civilian object (the clinic). The U.S. denied this, stating all targets were military-nuclear and any collateral damage was unintentional. Separately, Iran accused Israel of deliberately striking civilian infrastructure during its parallel air campaign: Tehran cited the bombing of Tehran’s Shahid Beheshti University and the Iranian Red Crescent HQ as evidence that Israel sought to terrorize the populace. These claims were echoed by outlets like Al-Mayadeen(Lebanon) and PressTV. International human rights groups (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International) called for investigations into all civilian casualty incidents. They noted that bombing a university and Red Crescent facility could constitute war crimes if done willfully. On the other side, Israeli officials accused Iran of war crimes for its missile that struck the Beersheba hospital, killing dozens of Israeli civilians – an act Iran said was an accident of war. The competing narratives on legality and morality underscore the deep divide: Western governments insisted their use of force was preventive and proportionate, whereas much of the Global South viewed it as aggressive and illegal. This schism played out in global forums, with Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states in the UN General Assembly drafting a resolution condemning the strikes and affirming Iran’s sovereignty (which passed with a wide majority, though non-binding).

Diplomatic Breakdown Leading Up to the Strike

Collapse of the JCPOA Framework: By 2025, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) had effectively disintegrated. The U.S. exit in 2018 set off a chain reaction: Iran, after a one-year patience period, began breaching JCPOA limits in 2019 and escalated these breaches through 2020–2022. Efforts by European signatories and intermediaries to resuscitate the deal under the Biden administration saw some progress in 2021–22, but ultimately failed. A draft agreement to restore JCPOA compliance was actually on the table by August 2022, but talks stalled over final sticking points – notably Iran’s demand for the IAEA to close its investigation into undeclared nuclear particles (the “safeguards probe”) and U.S. reluctance to lift the IRGC’s terrorism designation. In September 2022, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell lamented that Iranian responses were “not satisfactory” and negotiations entered a prolonged impasse. Concurrently, Iranian domestic unrest (the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022) and Tehran’s support for Russia in Ukraine (via drone transfers) cooled Western appetite for concessions. By 2023, the JCPOA was considered “beyond revival” by most analysts, with Iran’s program too advanced and the U.S. gearing up for an election year. Iran’s November 2024 enrichment of uranium metal (a weapons-relevant step) was seen as a final nail in the coffin.

Final Diplomatic Overtures: In early 2025, there were last-ditch diplomatic efforts to avert a crisis. Oman facilitated secret U.S.-Iran indirect talks aiming for a smaller “freeze for freeze” deal – Iran would cap enrichment at 60% and the U.S. would unfreeze some Iranian funds and ease oil sanctions. These backchannel talks reportedly made modest progress by May 2025. However, once Israel and Iran started exchanging fire openly in June (see below), the tentative Oman channel collapsed. On June 16, 2025, European leaders (the E3: UK, France, Germany) hurriedly convened a meeting with Iran in Geneva. Iran’s FM Abbas Araghchi met the E3 and the EU’s envoy for a marathon 7-hour negotiation on June 20. Per European diplomats, the talks were “tense and inconclusive.” Iran demanded an immediate halt to Israeli strikes and future U.S. guarantees, while the E3 pushed Iran to at least pause60% enrichment and missile testing. The meeting ended with only a vague pledge to “meet again in the near future.” Crucially, the day after this Geneva meeting, the U.S. launched its airstrikes on Iran, catching the Europeans off guard. No further E3-Iran talks were scheduled after that. EU foreign ministers, meeting in Luxembourg on June 22, expressed dismay that diplomacy had been upended; still, they refrained from condemning the U.S., instead faulting Iran’s “consistent non-compliance” as the root cause.

UN and Great-Power Diplomacy: The UN Security Council had been seized of the Iran issue periodically, but great-power splits prevented any effective action. In 2020, a U.S. attempt to invoke the snapback mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran failed, leaving a legal gray zone. Come 2023, the UN arms embargo and missile restrictions on Iran expired (per UNSCR 2231’s schedule), which Israel cited as increasing the threat. In the months leading to the conflict, Russia and China made it clear they would veto any new sanctions or authorization of force on Iran. During the immediate run-up to the strikes, the UNSC held emergency sessions (one on June 19 at Washington’s behest, focusing on Iranian missile attacks on Israel, and one on June 21 at Moscow’s request, focusing on Israel’s strikes in Iran). These became forums for rhetorical clashes: Western representatives cited Article 51 (self-defense) to justify Israel’s and eventually the U.S.’ actions, whereas Russia/China and Iran cited Article 2(4) (sovereignty and non-use of force) to condemn them. No unified action was possible. The breakdown of UNSC consensus was so severe that on June 23, the Council could not even agree on a statement calling for humanitarian pauses.

Israeli Covert Ops & Sabotage Campaign: A critical backdrop to the 2025 strike was Israel’s long-running shadow war against Iran’s nuclear program. From 2010’s Stuxnet cyberattack and scientist assassinations up through covert operations in 2021–2023, Israel continually sought to delay Iran’s progress. This included high-profile incidents:

April 2021: Explosions at Natanz’s enrichment halls (sabotage blamed on Mossad) destroyed cascades of IR-1 centrifuges.

June 2021: A drone strike hit Iran’s centrifuge assembly plant in Karaj.

Late 2021 – 2022: Suspected Israeli teams assassinated key IRGC and nuclear figures inside Iran, and drones struck an IRGC missile base in Kermanshah.

January 2023: Israel launched a drone attack on an Iranian defense industrial complex in Isfahan.
These actions cumulatively slowed Iran’s nuclear advancements by destroying equipment and sowing paranoia. However, they also hardened Iran’s stance. Tehran refused direct talks with Israel and cited these “acts of terrorism” in refusing further concessions to the West. Notably, in 2022 Iran started fortifying new underground enrichment facilities (e.g., near Natanz in the Zagros mountains) partly in response to sabotage – facilities which Western intelligence knew would be almost impregnable once finished. By 2025, with those sites nearing completion, Israel grew desperate to act sooner rather than later. This urgency fed into Israeli pressure on Washington to strike.

Proxy Conflicts and Flashpoints: The road to June 2025 was strewn with smaller conflicts that escalated tensions:

Iraq/Syria (U.S.-Iran proxy clashes): Iranian-backed militias (like Kataib Hezbollah and others in the Popular Mobilization Forces) repeatedly targeted U.S. bases and personnel. In March 2023, a drone attack on a U.S. base in Syria killed an American contractor, prompting U.S. airstrikes that killed several militants. These tit-for-tat exchanges continued. In April 2025, rockets hit Camp Victory near Baghdad (no casualties, but a clear message). The U.S. often responded with limited strikes on depots in Syria. Each incident risked wider escalation and added to Washington’s narrative of Iran as a destabilizing force.

Yemen and the Red Sea: The Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen, fighting a Saudi-led coalition, extended their reach. In late 2024 and into 2025, the Houthis fired missiles and drones at targets in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In early 2025, they even targeted an Israeli-owned cargo ship in the Red Sea (in purported retaliation for Israel’s Gaza war), causing slight damage. The U.S. was concerned that if conflict with Iran erupted, the Houthis would act as Iran’s second front. Indeed, just before the U.S. strike, the Houthis had agreed to pause Red Sea attacks in a deal with the U.S. (traded for a halt in Saudi airstrikes in Yemen) – a deal that unraveled when the U.S. bombed Iran. Subsequently, the Houthis declared the Red Sea a war zone for U.S. and Israeli vessels.

Naval Tensions in the Gulf: Throughout 2023–24, Iran’s IRGC Navy seized or harassed several commercial tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz, often in retaliation for Greek or U.S. seizure of Iranian oil shipments. These incidents (for example, the brief Iranian seizure of the MV Southys in May 2023, and a near-clash with U.S. escorts) kept the Gulf on edge. The U.S. bolstered its naval presence (even deploying the USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group in late 2024) to deter Iran. This maritime tension contributed to the conflict calculus: Washington was loath to have Iran capable of brandishing a nuclear deterrent while already engaging in “piracy” at sea.

Iran’s Regional Militant Network: Iran’s support for regional allies – Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq/Syria, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza – was a constant irritant to the West and Israel. Israeli officials cited Iran’s arming of Hezbollah with precision missiles as “unacceptable strategic threat.” In the year before the war, Israeli Air Force strikes against Iranian personnel in Syria intensified (targeting weapons convoys). Iran occasionally retaliated with limited rocket fire from Syria into the Golan Heights. The cumulative effect was a slide toward direct confrontation.

Trigger: Israel-Hamas War (2023–2025): A major flashpoint was the Israel-Hamas war that erupted in October 2023 after Hamas’s attack on southern Israel. Israel’s subsequent military response in Gaza was protracted and very bloody. By mid-2024, Gaza City lay in ruins, and by mid-2025, Palestinian casualties exceeded 50,000. Iran vocally supported Hamas and Islamic Jihad (politically and with limited arms smuggling), and Israel accused Iran of instigating the multi-front unrest (including Hezbollah’s sporadic missile launches from Lebanon and unrest in the West Bank). Tensions between Israel and Iran escalated beyond proxy context. In early June 2025, as Iran’s Supreme Leader called on Muslims to defend Gaza, there was a dramatic incident: Iran launched a volley of long-range missiles from its territory toward Israel. One missile struck near a hospital in Beersheba, Israel, causing dozens of injuries and panic. Iran neither confirmed nor denied its direct role (some speculate it was an IRGC unit acting autonomously or a response to a misattributed Israeli covert strike). Israel took this as a casus belli – a direct Iranian attack on Israeli soil. On 13 June 2025, Israel’s Air Force carried out major strikes on Iranian soil (the first overt Israeli attack on Iran in history), hitting targets including the Natanz power infrastructure and certain missile bases. This was the point of no return: from June 13 onward, Israel and Iran were in a de facto state of war, exchanging strikes daily. Iran fired additional missiles and deployed drones at Israeli cities and bases (some intercepted by Israel’s missile defenses, but a few struck, e.g. the Beersheba incident). Israel escalated by targeting dozens of Iranian military sites on June 22 (simultaneous to the U.S. strike), including IRGC missile depots and launchers across Iran – a campaign coordinated with U.S. action.

Diplomacy Fails, War Dawns: In the frantic days before the U.S. attack, multiple mediation offers came and went. Russia offered to host talks in Moscow (Iran was receptive, even as Araghchi met Putin, but the U.S. dismissed this as a stalling tactic). The UN Secretary-General dispatched envoys to Washington and Tehran pleading for a pause; these were overtaken by events. It became evident that once Israel and Iran were openly trading blows and Iran edged so close to nuclear weapons capacity, Washington chose to strike rather than step back. Each side blamed the other for the diplomatic collapse: Western officials pointed to Iran’s rejection of a compromise nuclear deal and its missile attack on Israel, while Iran cited the West’s failure to lift sanctions and Israel’s unprovoked aerial bombardment starting June 13. In essence, by late June 2025, the avenues of diplomacy that had been painstakingly built over years crumbled under the weight of fast-moving military developments and zero trust among the key actors.

Strategic & Global Implications

Satellite imagery shows damage at Iran’s Fordow uranium enrichment facility after the U.S. “bunker buster” strikes in June 2025. The attack marked the first direct U.S. military intervention against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Iran’s Immediate Military Posture: In the aftermath of the strikes, Iran adopted a mix of retaliation and restraint. Its retaliatory missile attacks on U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq (June 23) were symbolically significant – the first direct Iranian strikes on U.S. forces in decades – yet notably measured. Tehran’s decision to target remote desert bases and to time its strikes when personnel could seek shelter suggested Iran avoided mass U.S. casualties, likely to prevent giving Washington a pretext for broader war. Simultaneously, Iran activated its network of regional proxies against Israel: Hezbollah stepped up rocket fire from Lebanon (prompting Israel to shift some focus north), and militia rockets hit near U.S. facilities in eastern Syria. The IRGC’s navy was put on high alert, and there were reports of mine-laying activity in the Persian Gulf (though no significant incident occurred, likely because Iran did not want to provoke international navies assembled there). Iran’s conventional military, while regionally formidable, was outmatched by U.S. power; thus Iran leaned into asymmetric tactics – cyber attacks (a wave of cyber intrusions hit Israeli government sites and a minor breach of a U.S. energy company was attributed to Iranian hackers), and the threat of unleashing militant allies. Notably, within Iran, hardliners pushed for an all-out response including leaving the NPT and even rushing to build a bomb, while moderates counseled caution to survive the crisis. The result was a calibrated Iranian posture: retaliate enough to save face and deter further attacks, but stop short of actions that would invite devastating U.S. retaliation (like mining Hormuz or striking major U.S. cities in the Gulf).

Risk of Regional War: The conflict significantly raised the specter of a broader Middle East war. With Israel and Iran in open combat, other fronts ignited. Hezbollah’s involvement threatened a second Israel-Lebanon war. In Iraq, pro-Iran paramilitaries launched mortars at the sprawling U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone (causing minor damage and prompting a U.S. evacuation of non-essential personnel). The U.S. rushed additional Patriot air defense batteries to its bases in Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE, anticipating possible Iranian ballistic missile volleys. Global jihadist groups (ISIS remnants, etc.) also sought to exploit the chaos, although with limited success. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin warning that Iran or Hezbollah might attempt terror attacks or cyber sabotage against U.S. interests globally. The FBI and DHS held calls with state governors about tightening security, noting an uptick in cyber probing of infrastructure and the possibility of Hezbollah cells activating in Latin America or elsewhere. Thus, while a full regional conflagration was avoided in the initial weeks (thanks to restraint from Iran and behind-scenes U.S.-Iran messages via Switzerland), the situation was volatile and could have easily spiraled.

Energy Markets and Strait of Hormuz: The Strait of Hormuz, through which ~20% of the world’s oil passes, became a choke point of intense focus. Early in the conflict, Iran’s Parliament symbolically voted to close the Strait in retaliation for the U.S. strikes. Although Iran did not physically attempt to block Hormuz at that time (knowing the U.S. Navy would intervene), it did conduct high-profile naval exercises and warned commercial ships to avoid its waters. Insurance rates for Gulf shipping skyrocketed. Several oil tankers were delayed or re-routed around the Cape of Good Hope as a precaution. The mere threat drove oil prices into a sharp spike: Brent crude jumped over $150/barrel in late June 2025, the highest since 2008, before stabilizing slightly on hopes of mediation. The U.S. tapped its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to calm markets, and President Trump controversially urged OPEC (and even U.S. domestic producers) to “pump more oil” to prevent an energy crunch. Countries like China and India, heavily dependent on Gulf oil, were alarmed – China even sent naval vessels to the Arabian Sea for “escort duties,” signaling it might take an active role in protecting shipping. This highlighted how a U.S.-Iran war directly threatened the global economy. If Iran had mined or closed Hormuz, it could have plunged the world into recession; fortunately, that worst-case scenario did not fully materialize as Iran held that card in reserve. Still, energy security shot to the top of many nations’ agendas, spurring talks about alternative pipelines (e.g., reviving the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, accelerating Saudi’s Red Sea coast projects, etc.) to bypass Hormuz. The crisis underscored that the Gulf remains the world’s oil artery – and how quickly it can be constricted by conflict.

Global Alliances and Realignments: The 2025 Iran conflict led to noticeable shifts in international alignments:

Iran drew closer to the Russia-China bloc than ever. Only days after the strikes, Iran’s President (Ebrahim Raisi’s interim successor, as Iran was in a leadership transition) flew to Beijing for emergency consultations, marking a defiant message that Iran would not be isolated. Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was expedited (formalized in late 2025) and its pending entry into BRICS was given fast-track consideration by Russia and China. These moves signaled a potential eastward pivot of Iran’s economy and diplomacy, as a counter-weight to Western pressure.

Among U.S. allies, there was unease and debate. Europe presented a somewhat divided front: the UK firmly supported the U.S. action, France and Germany were more reserved (their officials privately criticized the U.S. for abandoning diplomacy and feared a precedent legitimizing strikes on safeguarded facilities). This in turn fed European calls for more strategic autonomy – the idea that Europe should be able to manage its own security crises independent of unpredictable U.S. decisions. NATO as an alliance wasn’t directly engaged, but the episode prompted discussions within NATO about contingency plans if Iran retaliated against Turkey or if Russia tried to exploit NATO’s focus on the Middle East.

The Arab Gulf states found their recent tentative rapprochement with Iran (e.g., the Saudi-Iran Beijing-brokered normalization of 2023) in tatters. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and others publicly remained neutral but quietly allowed U.S. forces to use their airspace and facilities during the operation. When Iran’s fury turned toward Israel and the U.S. rather than the Gulf monarchies, the Arab states sighed in relief – but also re-evaluated their security postures. Saudi accelerated talks to buy more missile defense systems (like THAAD) and even contemplated pursuing a domestic nuclear program (with Pakistan’s or China’s help) as a long-term hedge. The UAE bolstered its ties with Israel somewhat more openly, seeing Israel as a partner against Iranian aggression.

Israel’s strategic position was paradoxically bolstered in the short term (with Iran’s nuclear program hit and the U.S. explicitly in its corner) but long-term potentially undermined. Regionally, Israel’s normalization with Arab states (Abraham Accords) survived – common cause against Iran still united them. But domestically within Israel, the strain of multi-front conflict (Iran, Hezbollah, Gaza) and massive reserve call-ups led to public discontent. Netanyahu’s government framed the war as a historic victory – eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat and weakening Iran’s military – but critics argued it came at high cost (Hezbollah was not defeated, and Israel’s cities had suffered unprecedented missile barrages). Notably, former PM Ehud Olmert and others called for an end to the Iran and Gaza wars to focus on internal healing. Olmert argued Israel must “turn inside” and that two years of fighting (against Hamas and now Iran) had deeply damaged Israeli society. This hinted at potential shifts in Israeli politics and strategy once the dust settled.

United States: The conflict had political repercussions in Washington. Domestically, it stirred debate about war powers and America’s role. The President’s supporters hailed the strike as bold leadership that “showed the world America won’t be blackmailed by nukes.” Critics, including some opposition lawmakers, denounced it as an unauthorized escalation – one prominent Congresswoman labeled it a “grave violation of the Constitution” (arguing that only Congress can declare war). This led to calls for reining in executive war powers. On the global stage, U.S. credibility took a nuanced hit: while allies like Israel and Saudi saw the U.S. as strongly committed to their security, rivals like Russia and China capitalized on the event to portray the U.S. as a violator of international norms. America’s relationship with Europe also experienced some strain, as noted above. Over the longer term, the U.S. may find the international diplomatic fallout complicates other issues (for instance, efforts to rally support against Russia’s actions in Ukraine encountered more resistance from countries angry about Iran).

Non-Proliferation Norms & Nuclear Taboo: The strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities – a state that, however close to nuclear weapons capability, legally remained non-nuclear and under IAEA safeguards – set a controversial precedent. Non-proliferation experts warned that this could erode the incentives for states to stay within the NPT if they feel they might be attacked regardless. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an analysis asking, “Does the Iran strike mark the death of arms control in the Middle East?” Many noted the lesson other countries might take: having nuclear weapons, not just nuclear technology, is what deters foreign attack. North Korea’s official news agency indeed crowed that Iran’s fate “proves the justice” of Pyongyang’s decision to build a nuclear arsenal. Within Iran, even moderate voices were persuaded that pursuing an actual nuclear deterrent might be the only way to ensure long-term security, precisely the opposite of what the strikes intended. Silentwing analysts inside the Order have termed this dynamic the “Proliferation Paradox” – striking to prevent proliferation may in fact incentivize it among adversaries. Moreover, the attacks breached what some considered the taboo on attacking active nuclear facilities (often called “Nuclear Pearl Harbor” scenario). Grossi’s warnings were borne out to a degree: while no significant radiological disaster occurred (Fordow and Natanz thankfully did not release radiation), it was largely luck. Had Bushehr been hit or had the strikes gone awry, a nuclear catastrophe was possible. Moving forward, states are likely to harden their facilities even more or bury programs deeper underground (as Iran surely will). There is also talk of pushing for an international agreement or at least norms against military attacks on nuclear plants – though after 2025, such proposals face an uphill battle.

Strategic Balance and Military Lessons: In pure military terms, the 2025 strikes and subsequent exchanges yielded important insights:

The U.S. demonstrated it can devastate hardened targets with advanced ordnance (the MOP bomb), but also that truly deeply buried sites (like Fordow) are extremely challenging to fully destroy. This will influence war planners and potentially weapons developers (e.g., exploring even heavier penetrators or more creative means like earth-penetrating nuclear weapons – a topic that resurfaced controversially in the U.S.).

Air defenses proved critical but not infallible. Israel’s multilayered system (Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome) was overwhelmed at times by sheer volume of Iranian missiles and drones, although it prevented far worse damage. The U.S. Patriot and THAAD batteries in the Gulf showed effectiveness (they intercepted most of the missiles Iran fired at Al Udeid, per Qatar’s statement). Yet one or two got through at Ain al-Assad, reminding that no shield is 100%.

Cyber and Space domains played roles: Iran attempted GPS jamming and cyberattacks on Israeli critical infrastructure. The U.S. used cyber (and possibly electromagnetic) attacks to blind Iranian radar during the strike. Satellite imagery (Maxar, Planet Labs) and open-source intelligence played a huge role in the information war, as seen by commercial satellite photos debunking some of Trump’s “obliteration” claims. This underscores how transparency can shape the narrative in modern conflicts, as opposed to the 1981 Osirak strike which remained murky for years.

Regionally, the balance of power after the strikes shifted against Iran in the short term – its known nuclear facilities were wrecked and a chunk of its missile arsenal expended or destroyed on the ground by Israel’s follow-up raids. But Iran retains significant capabilities: a large ballistic missile force (especially medium-range Shahab-3 and Emad missiles) survived, as did its thousands of militia proxies. Iran’s conventional military (navy, air force) remains weaker than U.S./Israel, so it will likely double-down on asymmetric assets and potentially covertly accelerate any nuclear weapon-related design work (as a future deterrent). The strikes may thus usher in a more dangerous phase if Iran chooses to rebuild its program in a more survival-oriented, weapon-focused way.